







THE FUTURE OF ATLANTA’S  
HOUSING OPPORTUNITY FUND 
 















This document was completed by Michael Hellier to assist The Atlanta Housing 
Association of Neighborhood-based Developers with their decisions regarding 
Atlanta’s Housing Opportunity Fund. This document is also a part of an applied 
research paper for the Master of City and Regional Planning program at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, under the guidance and supervision of Professor Dan 
Immergluck. 
I want to thank all who took the survey, as well as the following people for their 
assistance. 


















Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Housing Opportunity Fund ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
State of American Cities ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
Atlanta’s Housing Needs ........................................................................................................................................... 7 
Revenue Sources ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 
Challenging Times .................................................................................................................................................. 10 
Common Revenue Sources ................................................................................................................................... 11 
Survey Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................... 14 
Number of Sources ................................................................................................................................................. 16 
Opposition ............................................................................................................................................................... 17 
Building Support ..................................................................................................................................................... 18 
Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................. 18 
OPTION 1: Identify sources to service the GO Bond debt service................................................................. 19 
OPTION 2: Identify Revenue Sources without Using a Go Bond ................................................................... 21 
Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................. 28 
Allocation of Future Funds ........................................................................................................................................ 29 
Allocation of Previous Funds ................................................................................................................................. 29 
Affordable Housing Post Recession ...................................................................................................................... 30 
Survey Results ......................................................................................................................................................... 31 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................... 35 
Work Cited .................................................................................................................................................................. 37 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................... 38 
Initial Proposal ................................................................................................................................................... 38 
Detailed Workplan and Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 43 
Literature Review etc. ..................................................................................................................................... 55 
Survey 1 Respondents ..................................................................................................................................... 83 
Survey 2 Respondents ..................................................................................................................................... 85 







In 2007, the city of Atlanta approved a general obligation bond issuance to assist in the 
creation of workforce housing. Even in challenging economic times, the $13.5 million in expended 
funds has leveraged more than $94.4 million in private money and created over 1,200 units of 
quality workforce housing.  
In the past the general fund was the only source of revenue for the Housing Opportunity 
Fund, but this is proving to be an unreliable solution. To become a sustainable tool in incentivizing 
workforce housing in Atlanta, it is necessary to identify alternative revenue sources. This report 
explores potential revenue sources for the Housing Opportunity Fund, as well as the future 
allocation breakdown for when the trust fund is revitalized. The primary sources for 
recommendations were two separate surveys. The first (Affordable Housing Trust Fund Survey) 
was conducted at the end of 2011, which asked practitioners across the United States about their 
experience working with affordable housing trust funds.  The second survey (Housing Opportunity 
Fund Allocation Survey) was conducted in February 2012, and asked Atlanta housing practitioners, 
policy makers, and professors their opinions about past and future allocations of Housing 
Opportunity Fund money. 
HOUSING OPPORTUNITY FUND 
  
On April 11, 2007 the Urban Residential Finance Authority issued $35,000,000 of Georgia 
Taxable Revenue Bonds, and the proceeds went to the Housing Opportunity Fund.  Interest on the 
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bonds have been paid semiannually, with rates ranging from 5.068% to 5.802%.  The annual debt 
service required was $1,915,616 in 2007, and will range from $2.87 million to $2.89 million 
through 2027. As of February 7, 2012 the outstanding balance was $30,100,000 (Urban Residential 
Finance Authority, 2011).  
The debt service for this bond issuance has been, and will be, paid through the city of 
Atlanta’s general fund. This is defined by the city as the principal pool of money for a municipality, 
and accounts for all activities which do not have a unique fund (City of Atlanta, 2011a). In the past 
the general fund was the only source for the Housing Opportunity Fund, but this is proving to be 
an unreliable solution. The city has made it clear that they will not be able to issue another bond 
with the general fund servicing the debt. The underlying reasons are not exactly clear, but 
affordable housing losing importance, falling revenues, rising expenses, and lack of political will are 
all factors. Therefore, another method must be developed so the Housing Opportunity Fund can 
become a sustainable tool in incentivizing workforce housing in Atlanta. The following sections of 
this report will explore similar issues across the country, housing needs in Atlanta, and offers 
suggestions for reviving the Housing Opportunity Fund. 
 
STATE OF AMERICAN CITIES 
 
 The current economic recession has created a persistent challenge for cities starting in 
2007, and the situation will likely worsen over the next few years. A major reason for this 
increased difficulty is shrinking revenues, mainly because of a depressed real estate market that is 
continuing to force property values down. Since property taxes are a significant source of revenue 
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for municipalities, declining property values results in declining tax receipts. According to a survey 
of 1,055 cities completed by the National League of Cities, property taxes have fallen by 3.7 
percent since 2010 (Pagano, 2011). Unfortunately, cities will continue to experience declining 
property taxes through 2013 as assessments follow the market. Unstable consumer confidence, 
rising unemployment, and declining incomes have also resulted in falling tax receipts. Figure 1 
below displays percent changes in tax revenues. The data is from the survey completed by the 
National League of Cities mentioned above.  
 
SOURCE:(PAGANO, 2011) 
 Cities are forced to make extremely difficult decisions due to declining revenues. Programs 
are being cut, budgets slashed, and priorities rearranged. This scenario is occurring across the 
country, and the most recent and drastic example has occurred in California. Recently the state has 
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and preserving affordable housing units in the state, and many of these agencies were integral to the 
success of affordable housing trust funds (Dunham, 2012).  
The abolishment of the redevelopment agencies is an attempt to close the state’s budget 
gap, but the loss of these funds will have a drastic impact on affordable housing efforts in the state. 
Peggy Lee, the director of the Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California stated that 
“the 20 percent of tax-increment financing generated by redevelopment agencies is the single-most 
important source of local government financing for the creation and preservation of affordable 
housing throughout the state. This decision comes at the worst time when millions of Californians 
continue to lose their jobs to a struggling economy and their homes to foreclosure ("Court Rules 
California RDAs Can Be Eliminated," 2011).”  
ATLANTA’S HOUSING NEEDS 
 
There are many indicators that highlight the need for creating and preserving affordable 
housing units, including statistics on homelessness, housing affordability, and poverty.  
Homelessness is a glaring indicator of Atlanta’s gap in housing for certain populations since it 
results from lack of income and the inability afford housing (National Alliance to End 
Homelessness, 2012). On January 25, 2011 the 2011 Metro Atlanta Tri-Jurisdictional 
Collaborative Continuum of Care Homeless Census took place in Fulton and DeKalb County. 
During that night there were 6,000 homeless people counted within the city of Atlanta, and one 
out of three were spending that night in an unsheltered location (Pathways, 2011).  This is 
currently a major problem for the city, but since homelessness is a lagging indicator, there is reason 
to believe that the situation will only worsen in the coming years (National Alliance to End 
Homelessness, 2012).  
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Another indication that shows the importance for affordable housing efforts is looking at 
poverty and income within Atlanta. Real median household income declined by 20.7% from 2000 
to 2010. The decline is actually more drastic if inflation is taken into account (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2006 to 2010). Furthermore, 41 percent of citizens in the city of Atlanta are considered to be poor 
or struggiling according to the U.S. Census Bureau. When tracking poverty, the U.S. Census 
Bureau considers any person earning less than twice the poverty level as either struggling or poor. 
When compared to other scales and comparable cities, the city of Atlanta fares worse than 
Charlotte, Raleigh, Nashville, Georgia, the South Region, and the United States (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2006 to 2010).   
A more directly related indication of the need for affordable housing is housing 
affordability. According to the report “Out of Reach” by the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, 47 percent of renter households in the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta HMFA cannot 
afford a two-bedroom unit (Elina Bravve, 2011). Furthermore, one out of four renters in the city 
of Atlanta pays 50 percent or more of their household income to housing. This is higher than 
Charlotte, Raleigh, Nashville, Dallas, Housing, Georgia, the South Region, and the United States 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 to 2010). As indicated, incomes are falling, housing costs are rising, 
and homelessness will continue to be a major problem. These statistics convey the need for 
stronger affordable housing efforts, and the housing opportunity fund has been, and should be, a 








REVENUE SOURCES  
 
As mentioned above, the 
Affordable Housing Trust Fund Survey 
was conducted at the end of 2011 via an 
online survey, and asked various 
questions about affordable housing trust 
funds to 70 practitioners throughout the 
United States. The survey was meant to 
find out the current difficulties that trust 
funds were facing, as well as learn of any 
resilient revenue sources. The 30 
respondents worked in a wide variety of 
cities ranging from Montpelier, 
Vermont to West Hollywood, 
California. Clusters of responses surfaced on the east coast with the cities of Asheville, Charlotte, 
Knoxville, and North Charleston; as well as in California and the Midwest. There was a lack of 
responses in the southeast, which can be explained by the lack of trust funds in the region.  A 















Figure 2 - Raising Funds for Affordable Housing 











The initial set of questions was aimed at understanding whether raising funds for affordable 
housing have become more difficult, and if so, why this is occurring. The first question asked 
whether local governments were having more difficulty raising funds for affordable housing now, 
compared to five years ago. It is unsurprising that respondents overwhelmingly indicated that it is 
currently more difficult. As displayed in Figure 2, forty-eight percent felt that it has been a harder 
time, and thirty-five percent felt that it has been a much harder time. Fourteen percent felt that it 
has been about the same, and three percent, one respondent, felt that it has been much easier 
(Hellier, 2011). 
The next question asked the respondents why it has become more difficult, and give them 
three choices: declining revenues, rising expenses, or political climate. Forty-eight percent selected 
declining revenues, thirty-three percent selected the political climate, and nineteen percent 
selected rising expenses.   
Respondents also had the ability to write in comments and opinions as well. Some 
respondents referenced the raid on California’s redevelopment agencies, which is summarized 
above. A consistent theme in the comments was the declining availability of state and federal dollars 
and the simultaneous increase in competition for funds. Another comment explained how the 
depressed real estate market affects some cities ability to raise funds.  It certainly has an impact on 
declining revenues, but some affordable housing trust funds use fees from residential and 
commercial development to fund affordable housing efforts.  Therefore, this revenue source has all 
but disappeared for these areas since development is generally slow to negligent. Another impact of 
the depressed real estate market is the increased competition between municipalities. In an 
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example of a race to the bottom, areas are incentivized to be more “development-friendly” by 
decreasing, deferring, or abolishing fees (Hellier, 2011).  
 
COMMON REVENUE SOURCES 
 
 The following set of questions from the Affordable Housing Trust Fund Survey 
asks the respondents their opinion on what sources of revenue should be targeted. Before the 
results are explained, a survey conducted in 2007 by the Center for Community Change of various 
cities’ housing trust funds will be reviewed. Part of their research was to determine each fund’s 
revenue sources, and the most common sources out of the 56 trust funds surveyed were developer 
impact fees, the general fund, and inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees. Figure 4, located below, displays 
the most widely used funding sources; others not shown in the figure include casino revenue, 
excess lease fees, residual money from other funds, and the sales tax (Brooks, 2007). 
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Figure 4 - Center for Community Change Housing Trust Fund Report  
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The most common source of funding for the 30 surveyed affordable housing trust funds is a 
developer fee. These exactions from the private sector are used in approximately 38 percent of the 
funds. Typically these exactions are in the form of impact fees, more commonly known as linkage 
fees when referring to affordable housing, which occur when a municipality requires a developer to 
pay a “fee or exaction to compensate the government for the increase in facilities that will be 
required to service the development and the people who live there or use the developed facilities” 
(Werner, 2002). The fees are imposed when the development is platted or the building permitted 
at a per unit or per square foot basis (Frej, 2005). Linkage fees can be a great tool for communities 
to fund affordable housing efforts, but some municipalities abuse it by enforcing illegal exactions or 
pricing the fees too high. The right balance of equity is necessary for impact fees to be successful in 
the long run (Been, 2005). 
General Fund 
Another widely used source is the general fund. According to a survey conducted in 2007 
by the Center for Community Change, 25 percent of the surveyed affordable housing trust funds 
use the general fund as a source (Brooks, 2007). Although this is widely used, and may be relatively 
easy to acquire, it is highly vulnerable to cuts due to political whims and budgetary issues since it is 
part of the appropriation process. Furthermore, this fund has been decreasing since 2007 for cities 
across the country. Figure 4, located below, displays the percent change in general fund revenue 
and general fund expenditures. The data is from a survey completed by the National League of 
Cities, which sampled 1,055 cities (Pagano, 2011).  As displayed, revenue for the general fund has 
decreased since 2007, and looks to have bottomed out in 2010. However, positive growth of 




SOURCE: (PAGANO, 2011) 
Inclusionary Zoning Fees In-Lieu of Units 
The third most widely used source is fees in-lieu of units in areas with inclusionary zoning. 
Generally, inclusionary zoning requirements mandate a certain percentage of housing units be set 
aside at below market rate, but a developer can sometimes choose to pay a set fee in-lieu of the 
units. Out of the surveyed funds approximately 18 percent used this type of source. Essentially this 
strategy is linking affordable housing efforts with the city’s real estate activity by requiring 
developers to set aside a percentage of the units as affordable, or to pay a certain in-lie fee instead. 
Although it is ideal if the units are built within the market rate housing to create a mixed-income 
community, the in-lieu fees are important for the viability of some affordable housing trust funds. 
As with many of the strategies, this source is not immune to economic cycles and political 
transitions. In weaker markets, communities are often pressured into placing a moratorium on this 
policy to incentivize developers to build in their area (Center for Housing Policy, 2010). 
Tax Increment Financing 
Another revenue source for affordable housing trust funds is proceeds from tax increment 
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directs increases in property taxes above a base amount to a variety of services and projects. The 
increases in property taxes are generally stimulated by capital improvements in the district. 
Proceeds from TIF districts are not always diverted to affordable housing trust funds, but some 
municipalities have been successful with this method. The Salt Lake City Housing Trust Fund 




The Affordable Housing Trust Fund Survey conducted in 2011 asked respondents to 
identify the funding sources that are the best for funding affordable housing in the current climate. 
Respondents had the ability to choose one or more of the following; tax increment financing, 
public/private investment, inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees, bond, developer fee, document 
recording fee, program income, transient occupancy tax, leftover money from other funds, general 
fund, housing excise tax, sales tax, use tax, property tax, condominium conversion fee, or a 
residential demolition tax. Figure 6 below displays the top results from this question.  
 














Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees
Public/Private Investments
Tax Increment Financing
Percent of Respondents Recommending Source 
Figue 6  - Revenue Sources Recommended for Current Climate 
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 A similar question was asked later in the survey about what sources they would 





 There is not a significant difference in the responses between the two questions. 
The top three recommendations for both are public/private investment, tax increment financing, 
and inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees. After each question, respondents were asked why they 
responded as they did. By generalizing these comments, seven categories presented themselves. 
Respondents felt the sources they chose were either easier to acquire, and/or offered the least 
resistance; offered a reasonable nexus between affordable housing efforts and the sources of the 
funds extracted; presented the highest possible funds; were consistent and sustainable; or offered a 
chance for a collaborative approach (Hellier, 2011).  













Leftover money from other funds
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees
Tax Increment Financing
Public/Private Investments
Percent of Respondents Recommending Source 
Figure 7 - Revenue Sources Recommended for Atlanta 
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The two largest categories of rationales differ substantially. One reason for choosing the 
sources was the lack of resistance that would arise. The current economic climate has a significant 
impact on this thought process. Some sources would require a new tax or fee, and many believed 
that the community would oppose any attempt that contained either. Furthermore, most of the 
sources mentioned will require some sort of approval, so respondents suggest targeting the “lowest 
hanging fruit” (Hellier, 2011). The other category of rationales was a more positive and inspiring 
one. These respondents chose the sources that they felt offered a collaborative approach by bringing 
together diverse stakeholders to form a coalition.  This is undoubtedly a difficult method, but this 
group believes that a sustainable solution can be achieved if the community begins to view quality 
affordable housing as a shared vision. 
NUMBER OF SOURCES  
 
Respondents to the survey identified alternative strategies to pursing potential revenue 
sources. The first is to target a large and diverse group of sources to mitigate the risks of losing one 
or two. The current economic times are making this more and more apparent. It is also easier to 
secure smaller amounts of funds from a variety of sources, rather than large amounts of funds from 
a few. Conversely, some respondents felt that controlling the amount of sources targeted is a wise 
decision. First of all, it limits the amount of opponents to the trust fund, assuming the industry 
targeted as a revenue source opposes it. Furthermore, respondents felt that trying to coordinate a 
large number of sources can become confusing, complicated, and sometimes counterproductive. 
The majority of respondents believed that targeting three to four sources provided the right 
balance. However, it is apparent that each city will have a somewhat unique experience when it 





Another question asked respondents about the potential opposition to utilizing various 
revenue sources. Respondents were asked to rate a list of revenue sources in terms of opposition; 1 
meaning no opposition, and 10 meaning insurmountable opposition. The responses were combined 
so the sources could be ranked1, and the results can be seen in Figure 8. It is clear that respondents 
feel that attempting to use a property or sales tax would be extremely difficult, especially in the 
current economic times. It is interesting to note that property tax and sales tax both had four 
respondents choose insurmountable opposition, and the general fund, use tax, and inclusionary 




                                                             
1 Calculation : Opposition = Ʃ [(1 x no opposition tally) + (2 x ……)+……+ (10 x insurmountable 
opposition tally)] 

















Opposition Score (See Previous Footnote) 





Respondents were also asked how to garner the most support for an affordable housing 
trust fund. This was an open ended question, but the responses fell under two types of suggestions. 
The first type was to build a diverse coalition to support the efforts. It is necessary to have housing 
organizations and leaders start the campaign, but the business community and politicians are critical 
to long term success. Some suggest bringing the business community to the table during the 
research phase. This will encourage them to validate the results, and help them understand the 
problem. This research can include analyzing the housing needs of the community, but another 
important component is a nexus study. A nexus study shows a link between non-residential 
commercial development and the need for affordable housing. This analysis takes into account a 
number of factors, ultimately equating an increase in commercial activity to the need for more 
housing units. In addition to the business community, it is important to engage politicians, low-
income residents, labor unions, faith-based organizations, neighborhood activists, etc.  
The second general suggestion is to take control of the overall discussion, and frame the 
message in a positive light. Opponents will negatively focus on the costs that an affordable housing 
trust fund will bring, but this is not the entire story. Focus on the personal and economic benefits, 
and explain how the economic impact will go beyond short-term employment opportunities. Also 
show the human side by having people tell their personal stories (Hellier, 2011). 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The City of Atlanta needs to decide which revenue sources to use for the Housing 
Opportunity Fund. As discussed earlier, City officials have stated that Atlanta will not use the 
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general fund to service the debt for another general obligation bond (GO Bond) issuance. With this 
knowledge, there are two realistic alternatives. 
The first is to continue to utilize general obligation bonds to fund the Housing Opportunity 
Fund. This would allow the trust fund to be adequately funded in the early stages, but require debt 
servicing over the life of the bonds. Since the debt service will be a consistent figure, it is necessary 
that the revenue sources used to pay it be consistent as well. This requirement limits what revenue 
sources can be used. A suitable amount of consistency is provided if a property tax, sales tax, or the 
general fund is used, but the other sources have the potential for such high annual variation that it 
may be difficult to support a general obligation bond issuance.  
The other option available is to raise funds without using a general obligation bond 
issuance. There are many reasons for doing this including the uncertain nature of the current bond 
market, the lack of debt service options, and the necessity to advocate for another bond issuance 
every few years. Choosing a different method to fund the trust fund provides greater stability and 
flexibility that increases the chance of sustainability, which is what the city needs. Inconsistent 
support for affordable housing efforts is detrimental for the citizens who lack adequate access to 
quality affordable units. A sustainable solution will be consistent over the years, and not have to 
fight for survival year after year. However, if this path is taken the annual funds available will be 
much lower. The revenue sources available using this method will still be limited due to a number 
of factors, but more flexible relative to option 1. 
OPTION 1: IDENTIFY SOURCES TO SERVICE THE GO BOND DEBT SERVICE 
 
 Potential sources will be analyzed based on whether it can support a general obligation 
bond and whether it is politically viable in Atlanta. The year-to-year stability of the fund and the 
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potential amount that can be raised from each source is important as well, but these factors are 
inherent in determining whether the source can support a bond issuance.  
 To support a general obligation bond issuance, revenue sources must be able to service the 
debt annually for 20 years or longer. Figure 9 displays the required debt service for the 2007 bond 
issuance.  
 
SOURCE: (URBAN RESIDENTIAL FINANCE AUTHORITY OF COA, 2012) 
 A subsequent bond issuance will likely be for less than the one issued in 2007, but it will 
still require significant and stable proceeds. Out of the revenue sources mentioned above, only 
seven are able to support a general obligation bond issuance. The general fund, a property tax, and 
sales tax produce a sufficiently consistent revenue stream to support a bond issuance. The following 
have the possibility to support a bond issuance, but are likely to  have more annual variation than 
desired. They are tax increment financing districts, a document recording fee, a linkage fee, and 
inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees. 
 Out of the general fund, a property tax, a sales tax, tax increment financing districts, 
document recording fees, linkage fees, and inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees, four would not be 





























































































Figure 9 - Required Debt Service 
21 
 
will not use this method to service the debt in the future. The second is inclusionary zoning in-lieu 
fees, which has a short history in Atlanta. Housing advocates recommended this method before, but 
talks ended due to opposition and the most recent economic recession. The other two sources are 
the property tax and sales tax. As discussed above, these were the sources with the most opposition 
according to the Affordable Housing Trust Fund Survey (Hellier, 2011). Both of these sources 
would need to be approved in some way, which would be quite difficult in this current economic 
climate.  
 After eliminating four revenue sources for this option, three are left that could possibly 
support a general obligation bond issuance and be viable in Atlanta. They are document recording 
fees, linkage fees, and tax increment financing districts. These three sources will be analyzed 
further after the discussion of option 2. Table 1 below summarizes the revenue sources for option 
1. 




Political Viability in Atlanta 
General Fund Yes 
Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has made it clear that they will not use the 
general fund for debt servicing. 
Property Tax Yes 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents rated a property tax as the revenue 
source with the most opposition. 
Sales Tax Yes 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents rated a sales tax as the revenue 
source with the second most opposition. 
TIF/TAD Yes Probable: Atlanta has a successful history using Tax Allocation Districts. 
Document Recording Fee Possibly 
Possible: This is not an impossible source to acquire, but it will invite 
opposition from the business community. 
Developer/Linkage Fee Possibly 
Possible: This is not an impossible source to acquire, but it will invite 




Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has explored this method before, but talks 
ended due to immense opposition and the most recent economic recession. 




The second option entails modifying the Housing Opportunity Fund into a trust fund that 
operates more like other cities. Revenue sources would annually fund housing efforts, instead of 
servicing the debt on bonds. There is a greater number of potential revenue sources with this 
option, but the general fund, inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees, a property tax, and a sales tax will be 
eliminated for the reasons stated in the analysis of option 1. The remaining revenue sources will be 
reviewed based on political viability in Atlanta, year to year stability, and funding potential. Table 2 
displays this analysis. 
Table 2 – Potential Revenue Sources (Without GO Bond) 
  Political Viability in Atlanta Year to Year Stability Funding Potential 
TIF/TAD 
Probable: Atlanta has a successful history 
using Tax Allocation Districts. 
Low: Revenue from Atlanta’s 
current TAD’s have seen large 
annual variations 
High: The potential 




Possible: This is not an impossible source 
to acquire, but it will invite opposition 
from the business community. 
Low: Real estate market variations 
have been high in recent years. 
Low:  Revenue Projections 
using typical recording fees 
are relatively low. 
Developer Fee 
Possible: This is not an impossible source 
to acquire, but it will invite opposition 
from the business community. 
Low: Real estate market variations 
have been high in recent years. 
High: The projected 
revenue from this source 




Possible: There would be nothing to 
prohibit this revenue source, but it is 
difficult to rely on.  
Low: Annual variation will likely 
be high due to the uncertain nature 
of philanthropic funds. 
Low: Potential funding 
from this source will likely 




Unlikely: It is unlikely that affordable 
housing efforts would have priority for 
these funds in Atlanta. 
Low: High variation and 
uncertainty. 
Low: If these funds are 
secured, they will likely be 
relatively minor. 
Program Income 
Very Likely: Income generated from the 
trust fund is desired by the city 
Low: Program income will 
fluctuate due to the nature of  the 
financial mechanisms 
Low: Program income will 
be low, if existent at all 
Condominium 
Conversion Fee 
Very Unlikely: In 2009 there was one 
condominium conversion permit in the city 
of Atlanta. In 2008 there were three, and 
in 2007 there were three. It is unlikely 
Low: Condominium conversions in 
the past decade were extremely 
volatile year to year. In absolute 
terms, year to year change 
Low: Fees exacted from 
condominium conversions 




The three methods that will be analyzed are tax increment financing districts, document 
recording fees, and linkage fees. However, this does not mean advocates should not target the 
other sources listed as well. Except for condominium conversion fees, the other sources would be 
useful as additional funding. They would most likely be relatively small proceeds, but small 
dedications from a variety of sources can help the trust fund to be successful and sustainable. 
Document Recording Fee 
A document recording fee is a fee charged on real estate documents recorded.  It can be 
based on property value, a flat fee, or based on pages recorded (Center for Housing Policy, 2011). 
Many jurisdictions use recording fees, and the exaction percentage varies, but this analysis utilizes a 
range of assessments from .025% to .1% of the conveyance. This exaction would create some 
burden the real estate industry. As discussed this source has the potential to support a general 
obligation bond issuance. 
Projecting revenue for this source is more straightforward than linkage fees and tax 
increment financing. It is generally a percentage of the consideration, or sale price, for each 
transaction. Some jurisdictions limit what types of transactions are subject to this transaction by 
location, amount of consideration, and use (Center for Housing Policy, 2011). Figure 12 displays 
the total amount of considerations for transactions in the city of Atlanta from 2005 to 2010. The 
volatile nature of this source can be seen, especially when looking at data from 2005 to 2010 
(Fulton County Tax Assessors, 2012). Table 3 below is an attempt to project revenue based on 
historical sale figures and a range of assessments from .025% to .1%. It is important to understand 
that these numbers are based off the top and bottom of the past real estate cycle. 
activity will pick up in the near future.  averaged 90 percent. foreseeable future. 
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From 2005 to 2010, a document recording fee could have raised a range of $1.07 million 
to $14.28 million annually and an average of $6.02 million annually. 
 

















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 12 - Total Amount of Conveyances ($) 
Table 3 - Recording Fee Sensitivity Analysis 
  Total Sales 0.025% 0.05% 0.075% 0.10% 
2005  $10,370,235,650   $2,592,559   $5,185,118   $7,777,677   $10,370,236  
2006  $14,288,131,823   $3,572,033   $7,144,066   $10,716,099   $14,288,132  
2007  $13,953,647,674   $3,488,412   $6,976,824   $10,465,236   $13,953,648  
2008  $6,199,917,782   $1,549,979   $3,099,959   $4,649,938   $6,199,918  
2009  $4,289,894,755   $1,072,474   $2,144,947   $3,217,421   $4,289,895  




 A linkage fee is a requirement by a municipality that a developer pay a fee to compensate 
the government for the increase in services needed for the proposed development (Center for 
Housing Policy, 2011). Linkage fees can be a great tool for communities to fund affordable housing 
efforts, and a majority of other trust funds use this as a major source of funding. The City of Atlanta 
currently has a variety of permit fees that differ from use to use. A building permit is required “to 
construct, erect, demolish, install, alter or repair…any building, structure, equipment, appliances 
or system…”. This exaction places a burden on the real estate industry, developers in particular. 
This source does have the possibility to support a general obligation bond. Table 4 displays linkage 
fees from other cities. 
Table 4 – Linkage Fee Examples 
Boston, MA $5.00 per square foot 
San Francisco, CA $7.05 per square foot 
Sacramento, CA Range from $.27 to $.99 per square foot depending on use 
Berkeley, CA $2.00 to $4.00 per square foot depending on use 
San Diego, CA $.26 to $1.06 per square foot depending on use 
Cambridge, MA $3.00 per square foot 
 
Figure 13 displays the potential revenue projections from 2004 to 2009 if a linkage fee 
were used. The fees assigned to each property use are based on San Diego and Sacramento. It is 
important to note that this is a very rough estimate, and that these numbers are based off the top 
and bottom of the past real estate cycle. The following assumptions explain how these figures were 
reached. Permitting data with construction cost of the work done was obtained, but the square 
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footage of the work done is not available. Thus, to estimate the square footage the following 
construction costs were assumed. Office—$150/sf ; Hotel—$150/sf ; Commercial—$90/sf ; 
Industrial—$50/sf (Marshall & Swift, 2011). There are obvious problems with these assumptions, 
including quality of building and costs changing over time, but to estimate revenue projections, the 
size of the permits must be estimated. Commercial uses include mercantile buildings, restaurants, 
businesses, and gas stations. Industrial uses include warehouses, office/warehouses, and industrial 
(City of Atlanta GIS Division, 2009). The permitting department does not categorize 
manufacturing buildings by itself, which will have a higher construction cost. The fee schedule 
assumed is as follows: Office—$1.06/sf ; Hotel—$.60/sf ; Commercial—$.79/sf ; Industrial—
$.26/sf. 
From 2004 to 2019, a linkage fee could have raised a range of $20.5 million to $40.6 
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Tax Increment Financing 
When a Tax Allocation District is established, the amount of property tax revenue is 
recorded based on the assessment prior to any development. A municipality then makes capital 
improvements, or subsidizes a developer to do so. The base amount continues to be used to fund 
city services, but any increase due to rising property values would be captured for the Housing 
Opportunity Fund (Center for Housing Policy, 2011). There are currently ten tax increment 
financing districts in Atlanta, or tax allocation districts as they are called locally. Due to the nature 
of these districts, it is difficult to project the potential revenue for this source. Figure 14 however 
displays the total source balance for Atlanta TAD’s from 2004 to 2010. This is the total remaining 
funds from all TAD’s at the end of each year. It is likely that any revenue from this source would be 
exacted out of the annual source balance. There will likely be some restrictions on the funds raised 
from this source. Any revenue obtained would most likely be required to be allocated back into the 
same tax allocation district, and would limit affordable units to those areas. 
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Due to the general obligation bond method’s inflexibility and instability, it is 
recommended to target revenue sources that can feed into the Housing Opportunity Fund on an 
annual basis. This will allow longevity for the fund, which it currently does not have. As of now, 
the City must agree to issue and pay the debt service on general obligation bonds each time the fund 
runs out, and its apparent now that this is not sustainable. It also will allow all funds to be used for 
affordable housing efforts, instead of servicing debt on a bond. The previous allocation of 
$35,000,000 in funds cost the city over $60,000,000. That means 42%, or approximately 
$25,000,000 will have gone to servicing the debt by 2027. 
Through the research and surveys completed, the city should begin targeting linkage fees, 
document recording fees, and funds from tax increment financing/tax allocation districts. These 
sources have relatively high viability in Atlanta, sustainability, and potential magnitude. As 
discussed earlier it is recommended to target three to four sources. This will provide a diverse base 
that will increase the probability for a sustainable trust fund. Other sources to target include 
program income, leftover funds from other programs, and philanthropic funds. 
In addition to the above recommendations, housing advocates should identify potential 
revenue sources that may not be apparent currently. The discussions for the new Atlanta Falcons 
football stadium may present an opportunity. The surrounding community should have a seat at the 
table in the negotiations for this proposal, and it may be useful to leverage this. If they are not doing 
so already, they might develop a community benefits agreement (CBA). This agreement could 




ALLOCATION OF FUTURE FUNDS 
 
The second part of this research focuses on determining how future funds should be 
allocated. The breakdown from the initial allocation may have been appropriate then, but the 
changing economic landscape has altered priorities in the community. A survey was conducted in 
February 2012, referred to as the Housing Opportunity Fund Allocation Survey, involving local 
housing practitioners, policy makers, and professors.  The results will be discussed later. Analyzing 
the past and understanding changing priorities will inform how future funds should be distributed.  
ALLOCATION OF PREVIOUS FUNDS 
 
The Housing Opportunity Fund commenced during Mayor Shirley Franklin’s 
administration with the goal of adding 10,000 units of affordable workforce housing by 2009 
(Atlanta Development Authority, 2011). Workforce housing is defined by the Urban Land Institute 
defines as “housing that is affordable to households earning 60 to 120 percent of the area median 
income.” More simply put, it is the void between subsidized affordable housing and market rate 
housing (Urban Land Institute, 2011). One of the primary steps toward that was the establishment 
of the Housing Opportunity Fund, which raised money through a general obligation bond issuance. 
This fund brought together four major stakeholders in 2007 to make a positive impact on the 
affordable housing stock in Atlanta through multi-family loans, single-family loans, land 
assemblage, Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO) loans, and HOPE VI 
investment. The partnership operated with the City of Atlanta deciding how the funds would be 
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distributed and the Urban Residential Finance Authority issuing the general obligation bonds 
(Atlanta Development Authority, 2011). 
 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING POST RECESSION 
 
Since 2007 the affordable housing landscape has changed and priorities have shifted. The 
increase in foreclosures and unemployment has had a depressing impact on low-income households, 
exacerbating the already bleak affordable housing landscape in most areas. Before the recession the 
homeownership industry was growing at an unsustainable rate. Home prices were skyrocketing and 
lending requirements were extremely relaxed. This led to approximately 2.5 million foreclosures 
when the economy declined in 2007. The increase in foreclosures not only presented a new issue 
for advocates, it also made apparent the lack of affordable rental units (Smith, 2011). In 2009, 7.1 
million households had worst case needs, which HUD defines as “very low-income renters who do 
not receive government housing assistance and who either paid more than one-half of their income 
for rent or lived in severely inadequate conditions, or both (Steffen, 2011). These households with 
worst case needs are impacted more by economic downturns without the proper assistance. 
It would seem that declining home prices would reduce the housing cost burden for all 
income levels, but this has not been the case over the past few years. As of 2009, over 33 percent 
of households were paying over 30 percent of their income for housing, and 17 percent were 
spending over 50 percent. These numbers are already significant, and it is probable for the situation 
to worsen over the next few years (Joint Center For Housing Studies, 2011). These issues “reflect 
the long-term rise in housing costs and the ongoing weakness in income growth in the bottom half 
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of the distribution (Joint Center For Housing Studies, 2011).” This trend started in 2000, and the 
recent economic recession has only made matters worse. 
As indicated, the recent recession has brought about devastating foreclosures which are 
magnifying the need for affordable rental units, as well as the need for stabilization and foreclosure 
prevention assistance. This foreclosure crisis has, and will continue to have, a negative effect on 
communities, especially low-income neighborhoods that lack enough demand to absorb the 
increase in vacant homes. This increase results in a decline of property values for the surrounding 
neighborhood due to negative physical externalities from the vacant properties, as well as the 
discounted sales prices that real estate owned (REO) properties sell for. The lower sale prices 
effects the neighborhood because of the most common form of value determination in appraisal 
methodology. This method, known as the sales comparison approach, concludes to a value based 
off of comparable sales. Thus, artificially low sale prices from REO sales will bring typical sales 
prices down. Another negative impact is the physical results from increases in vacant properties, 
which tend to be blighted and havens for crime (Immergluck, 2011) 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 Having summarized affordable housing needs on a national scale, it is necessary to focus on 
the city of Atlanta. The Housing Opportunity Fund Allocation Survey conducted in February 2012 
was intended to document the opinions of local housing advocates. The online survey was sent to 
36 practitioners, with 15 of them responding. The respondents were affordable housing advocates 
at the non-profit, private, government, or academic level. The list of respondents can be found in 
the appendix. The first question asked respondents if the previous allocation of funds was 
successful. Some participants were not completely familiar with the Housing Opportunity Fund, 
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but most had either used funds from the program, administered the trust fund, or were integral in 
the development of it.    Of the respondents, seven felt that it had been successful, and five felt that 
it had not. Respondents who felt it was successful referenced the programs timely downpayment 
assistance during a depressed housing market as an important tool for the community. The Housing 
Opportunity Fund was also critical in the redevelopment of the former public housing known as 
Harris Homes (Hellier, 2012).   
 Those that felt the allocation has not been successful cited various reasons. Dawn Luke of 
Invest Atlanta, formerly the Atlanta Development Authority, stated that “as the administrator of 
the program, we have revised the allocation several times to address market conditions.  The 
program components should be established and be firm but dollars should be fluid (Hellier, 2012).” 
Another shortcoming of the program was the funds set aside for gap financing for developers. This 
was largely ineffectual since developers had difficulty securing primary funds. Another belief, which 
contrasts with the statements from those who said the allocation was successful, was the inability of 
the Housing Opportunity Fund to adapt during the economic recession. Andy Shneggenburger of 
the Atlanta Housing Association of Neighborhood-based Developers (AHAND) stated that some 
lending requirements “were unable to remain useful through the housing market crash (Hellier, 
2012).”  
 The next set of questions focus on establishing priorities for a subsequent allocation. 
Respondents were asked to prioritize eleven different programs. Figure 15 below displays the 
average priority rating. This reflects the group’s overall view on the category. For example, since 
seven people chose no consideration or funding should be allocated for ownership units for 




 The top priority for a future allocation should be the mitigation of negative impacts from 
vacant and foreclosed properties. This is not a surprising answer, as the problems arising from 
vacant or foreclosed properties are well documented. In the supplemental comments, some 
respondents felt that foreclosure prevention is the highest priority, but other programs need to be 
evaluated to see if they are fulfilling a similar need. For example, the Hardest Hit Fund may already 
provide funding for foreclosure prevention efforts. In addition, respondents were able to specify 
other programs that should be considered. These include the preservation of units, services for 
homeless individuals and families, and resources for the rehabilitation of existing homes (Hellier, 
2012). 
The next question asks what percentage of funds should be allocated to each program. 
Respondents were asked to input a percentage for each choice, with the total adding up to 100. To 
aggregate the answers, the response total for each potential program has been divided by 6, as there 
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Ownership units for households below 30% AMI.
Ownership units for households between 30% and 50%…
Rental units for households between 80% and 120% AMI.
Relocation and other assistance for foreclosed…
Ownership units for households between 80% and 120%…
Rental units for households between 50% and 80% AMI.
Foreclosure prevention.
Ownership units for households between 50% and 80%…
Rental units for households below 30% AMI.
Rental units for households between 30% and 50% AMI.
Mitigation of negative impacts from vacant and…
Average Priority Rating 
Figure 15 - Funding Priorities 
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were six respondents who fully completed this question. This provides a percentage for the 
aggregated results, which Figure 16 displays. 
 
There are obvious takeaways from the results of this question. First, respondents feel that 
single-family construction should not be a priority. This is not surprising due to the current over 
supply of single-family homes in the metropolitan area. However, respondents do recommend 
providing single-family loans for down payment assistance and mortgage assistance. Other 
programs recommended for a large allocation were multi-family loans for new construction and 
rehab, land assemblage, foreclosure/vacant property mitigation, and seed money for transit 
oriented development. There are also more detailed recommendations. One is to bundle similar 
Single Family Loans (Down 
payment Assistance) 15% 
Single Family Loans 
(Mortgage Assistance) 13% 
Multifamily Loans – Rehab 
13% 
Land Assemblage for future 
affordable housing sites 
(Financing for acquisition, 
demolition, and land 
clearance) 13% 
Mitigation of negative 
impacts from vacant and 
foreclosed properties 12% 
Seed money for Transit 
Oriented Development 11% 
Multifamily Loans – New 
Construction 8% 
Single Family Builder 
Construction Financing 
(Rehabilitation) 5% 
Relocation and other 
assistance for foreclosed 
homeowners 5% 
CHDO Loans (Financing part 
of the acquisition, 
construction, or renovation 
of housing) 3% 
Single Family Builder 
Construction Financing 
(Acquisition) 2% 
Foreclosure Prevention 2% 
Firgure 18 - Suggested Allocation Breakdown  
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programs together, for example combining single-family acquisition and rehabilitation into a 
revolving loan product. Another is to focus on the rehabilitation of distressed or expiring multi-
family properties that are not obsolete. More general recommendations are to not confine the 
allocation categories so strictly. Richelle Patton of Tapestry Development Group believes the funds 
should be allowed to “meet market demand and have the best ability to secure other funds to 
leverage the HOF funds (Patton, R. 2012. Hellier. 2/17/2012).”  
CONCLUSION 
 
It is apparent that the city of Atlanta needs to increase and maintain affordable housing 
units, and a sustainable Housing Opportunity Fund can be a critical tool in this effort. For this to 
occur, the trust fund needs to be modified to reflect current realities. The City of Atlanta is not 
able to use the general fund as it has in the past, and even if advocates were successful in securing 
that as a source, this debate would likely surface again in five years. To avoid this instability and 
frequent disruption, the Housing Trust Fund should secure dedicated revenue sources that will be 
sustainable for the long term, and have the proceeds go towards unit production and preservation 
rather than interest payment. Furthermore, something needs to be done if Atlanta wants to 
compete with similar regions across the country and globe. Atlanta is currently one of the few 
major cities without a functioning housing trust fund. 
 When this does occur, Atlanta must reevaluate what the community needs. According to 
the Housing Opportunity Fund Allocation Survey, foreclosure mitigation, mortgage assistance, and 
multifamily production should be top priority. Furthermore, the fund must have the ability to adapt 
with the changing needs of the community. The next step is for affordable housing advocates to 
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retain the services of an experienced consultant, which will guide the advocates and City through 
the entire process. Starting at identifying what revenue sources to target, set a range of exactions 
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Questions I would like to answer: 
 
1. Housing advocates in the City of Atlanta would like for the second “Housing 
Opportunity Bond” issuance to occur. This would result in approximately $40 
million coming available to aid the community in a variety of categories, but this 
bond issuance would require a debt service of approximately $1.5 million to be 
paid. The initial bond issuance of $35 million had the city paying the debt service, 
but due to a number of reasons, this second issuance will not have this luxury. 
The mayors policy advisor has stated the second issuance would most likely occur 
if the debt service could be shared in some way.  
a. Question: What are the cities options to cover the debt service for the 
second general obligation bond issuance? 
b. How will this be answered?:  
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i. Analyze other cities/municipalities to compile a list of alternatives 
to solve this problem. Eventually shorten this list to only a handful 
of viable alternatives for the city. 
ii. To find these alternatives I will reach out to experts across the 
country and use these conversations to determine my alternatives. 
c. Initial Ideas from research(brief) and conversations:  
i. Create a secondary market and securitize the loans made within 
HOF 
ii. Revenue Bond/Certificate of Participation (Backed by the 
creditworthiness of the City of Atlanta) 




Taxes based off four different numbers  
Debt Service$847,500  
*all numbers based off 1 st  GO bond issuance 
 
Scenario 1(HOF) Scenario 2 (Private Only) Scenario 3 (Total Funds) Scenario 4 (Units) 
Multifamily Loans $                          66,642.79 $                             71,930.12 $                           71,194.44 $               185,267.44 
Single Family $                        442,206.50 $                          493,876.78 $                         486,687.39 $               415,866.28 
Ashley at Cabbagetown $                        279,196.36 $                          157,640.64 $                         174,553.87 $               246,366.28 
Land Assemblage $                          59,454.35 $                          124,052.46 $                         115,064.30 n/a 
     
Per Unit/Transaction 
    
Multifamily Loans $                                236.32 $                                   255.07 $                                 252.46 $                       656.98 
Single Family $                                698.59 $                                   780.22 $                                 768.86 $                       656.98 
Ashley at Cabbagetown $                                744.52 $                                   420.38 $                                 465.48 $                       656.98 
Land Assemblage n/a n/a n/a n/a 




2. The first HOF GO bond issuance was successful, but efficiency and effectiveness 
need to be reviewed. When the next bond issuance occurs, should one category 
have a higher weight than the other? Should some neighborhoods receive more 
attention than others? 
a. Question:  
i. How much funding should each category receive?  
ii. How much funding should each neighborhood receive? 
40 
 
1. After reconsidering this question, I believe that this is out 
of the scope of my topic. I want to focus more on the 
program itself, and not on determining what neighborhood 
is in most need of funds. Would you agree with this? 
b. How will this be answered?: Complete an in depth review of the funds 
dispensed, and determine whether the second issuance can put the funds to 
better use. This will be determined by establishing criteria to evaluate if 
any changes should be made from the first issuance. The criteria will be 
established by speaking to “experts” in the field, both within Atlanta and 
the United States, and through my research.  For example I would like to 
answer whether efficiency, area need, less cost, etc. has highest priority. 
 
 HOF Private Total % Units Complete % Efficiency(HOF/Unit) 
Multifamily Loans      1,780,000       11,886,644       13,666,644     0.08                     282.00     0.22                                  6,312  
Single Family    11,811,144       81,614,455       93,425,599     0.57                     633.00     0.49                                18,659  
Ashley at Cabbagetown      7,457,214       26,050,536       33,507,750     0.21                     375.00     0.29                                19,886  
Land Assemblage      1,588,000       20,500,000       22,088,000     0.14  n/a n/a n/a 
    22,636,358     140,051,635     162,687,993     1.00                 1,290.00     1.00                                44,857  
Initial Correspondents 
This is a list of people that I have been briefly introduced to that expressed 
interest in assisting me.  
Andy Schneggenburger - AHAND 
 
Meaghan Shannon-Vlkovic - Enterprise 
 
James Shelby – City of Atlanta 
 
David Bennett – City of Atlanta 
 
Peter Hayley -  University Community Development Corp. 
 
Natallie Keiser - RRC 
 




LaShawn M. Hoffman -  Pittsburgh Community Improvement Association 
Questions from email (From June 12th Converstation): 
 
 
1. Develop the proposal more 
2. What does "deciding if changes should be made" mean? 
a. see question 2 
3. The part about equal funding is also unclear 
a. see question 2 
4. How will your paper address the equality of funding vs. some other distribution? 
a. Not clear what you are asking. 
5. What sort of research or analysis would you do to inform this debate? 
6. See question 1 & 2What will you actually be doing in your project regarding this 
issue? 
a. See question 1 & 2 
7. If there are no good practices out there for pooling GO monies with other funds, 
what will you be doing research on? What are your research questions? 
a. I believe that Shelly stated that GO monies do not fund affordable housing 
anywhere else. I am not 100% clear myself, but will ask tomorrow. My 
thoughts were to research/develop a method of funding the debt service 
for the second GO bond issuance.Research Questions-See question 1 &2 
8. As you've described these two items they are more decision points that 
policymakers need to make, but they do not describe what your option paper will 
be and what research or analysis you will conduct. 
a. See question 1 &2 
9. I am also now unclear on what the first part (the earlier one) will entail if no other 
cities use GO bonds for affordable housing. This implies that you will not find 
any good practices of combining GO monies with other funding sources. 
a. See question 1 
10. Overall, I think you need to sort of "start over" and set out a list of research 
questions that you hope to address in the paper. Then describe how you will go 
about trying to answer them. One way that sometimes helps folks is to draft a 
hypothetical outline of your final paper that identifies the research questions and 













































 The Housing Opportunity Fund is one of Atlanta’s tools in establishing quality 
workforce housing to its citizens with the goal of providing “financing to address a wide 
range of affordable housing needs across the income spectrum for homeowners, builders, 
developers, and community housing development organizations(CHDOS) (Authority, 
2011b). There has already been one bond issuance, and there is another budgeted to take 
place in the near future. The first allocation of funds resulted in approximately 1,300 units 
of affordable workforce housing, and has been deemed successful. However, in light of the 
recent hardships the city of Atlanta has faced it is unable to pay the debt service on the bond 
issuance. Through my research I am striving to offer the city viable alternatives to pay for 
this debt service, as well as suggest an allocation breakdown for the next bond issuance.  
 
Background on the Research Topic 
 
 The Housing Opportunity Fund commenced during Mayor Shirley Franklin’s 
administration with the goal of adding 10,000 units of affordable workforce housing by 
2009 (Authority, 2011a). Workforce housing is defined by the Urban Land Institute defines 
as “housing that is affordable to households earning 60 to 120 percent of the area median 
income.” More simply put, it is the void between subsidized affordable housing and market 
rate housing (Institute, 2011). One of the primary steps toward that goal of Mayor Shirley 
Franklin’s goal the Housing Opportunity Fund which raised money through a general 
obligation bond issuance. This fund brought together four major stakeholders in 2007 to 
make a positive impact on the affordable housing stock in Atlanta through multi-family 
loans, single-family loans, land assemblage, Community Housing Development Organization 
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(CHDO) loans, and HOPE VI investment. The partnership operated with the City of Atlanta 
deciding how the funds would be distributed and the Urban Residential Finance Authority 
issuing the general obligation bonds (Authority, 2011a). The first bond issuance was 
regarded as a success, but before results are analyzed and the future discussed, the events 
leading up to the Housing Opportunity Fund will be briefly chronicled. 
 Mayor Shirley Franklin’s goal of significantly adding to the affordable housing stock 
in the City of Atlanta began as soon as she took office. In 2002 a taskforce was 
commissioned to establish recommendations that responded to the city’s housing needs. In 
a report titled “A Vision for Housing in Atlanta: Great Housing in Great Neighborhoods”, 
there were six strategic actions recommended. They were to improve the regulatory 
process, leverage resources already possessed, emphasize the need for workforce housing, 
protect and expand options for senior citizens, establish relationships within the 
community to create great neighborhoods, and appoint a housing czar (Franklin, 2002).   
 The main goal of the task force was to take Mayor Shirley Franklin’s vision and 
produce practical steps that would reach the goals set forth. Before the task force began its 
work, it recognized two basic premises that set the tone for the rest of their appointment. 
The first was establishing a causal relationship between poor school quality, crime, lack of 
park space, inadequate access to goods and services, and inadequate housing to the poverty 
that many of the city’s residents face.  The second premise was understanding the 
advantage the city had in leveraging the existing physical assets (Franklin, 2002). With 
these foundations, the taskforce set out to revitalize existing neighborhoods for current 
residents, and to expand the middle-class through attracting more people into the city of 




 The next significant event leading to the Housing Opportunity Fund took place in 
2004 with the New Century Economic Development Plan for the City of Atlanta. In this 
report seven goals were established with a deadline of 2009, one being to add 10,000 
workforce housing units. To accomplish this, the report identified six action items identified 
below, including establishing a trust fund to be administered by the Atlanta Development 





Action Items Owner Active 
Partners 
Launch Date Completion 
Date 
Reformate and expand the 
Urban Enterprise Zone Program 
Planning ADA Q4, 2005 Ongoing 
Implement an effective 
Inclusionary Zoning program 
Planning N/A In Process Ongoing 
Use Tax Allocation Districts and 
URFA aggressively to generate 
affordable housing 
ADA N/A In Process Ongoing 
Establish a Workforce Housing 
Trust Fund 
ADA N/A Q4, 2005 Q4, 2005 
Adopt a standardized definition 
for workforce housing 
Planning N/A Q4, 2005 Q2, 2005 
Form a City team to implement, 
monitor and report on the 
program 
Planning N/A Q3, 2005 Q4, 2005 
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Source: (Company, 2004 & 2005) 
 
   
 The buildup of support to improve the affordable housing stock in Atlanta, 
specifically workforce housing, culminated when the city established the Housing 
Opportunity Fund in 2007. The goal was “to provide financing to address a wide range of 
affordable housing needs across the income spectrum for homeowners, builders, 
developers, and community housing development organizations(CHDOS) (Authority, 
2011b)”. The initial issuance was approved for $35 million and allocated to eight different 
categories involving loans, HOPE IV investment, and land acquisition. The largest category 
in terms of the revised budget was single family mortgage assistance, which entailed a 
second mortgage loan amounting to 10 percent of the sale price for home purchase, as well 
as loans for purchase and rehabilitation (Authority, 2011b). The loans were structured at 0 
percent interest with repayment due if the property was sold, refinanced, or rented out. The 
second largest category was an investment in a HOPE VI property, Ashley at Collegetown. 
The multifamily loan category was third largest, which gave second mortgages to 
multifamily developers producing affordable rental workforce housing units. The next 
largest categories were loans given to developers for land acquisition to develop affordable 
housing, and direct funds available for land acquisition located in a Tax Allocation District 
(TAD). The smallest category was funds allocated to CHDO’s for affordable housing 
development, both single family and multifamily. In the end, the entire revised budget 
amounted to approximately $28 million, which leveraged approximately $140 million, and 
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 The Housing Opportunity Fund is currently approved for a second bond issuance, 
but the city of Atlanta is not in a position to pay the $1.5 million in debt servicing required. 
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Regardless of the reason, if this opportunity passes the community would be forgoing 
approximately $40 million in funding for affordable housing, resulting in nearly $196 
million in leveraged funds and 1,800 of completed units according to the data from the first 
fund distribution. To avoid losing out on such an impactful resource, questions need to be 
answered. Most importantly, what are the cities options to cover the debt service for the 
second general obligation bond issuance? It is understood that the city is not able to cover 
the debt service, thus another source of funds will need to be identified. Affordable housing 
advocates prefer an option that is sustainable enough to survive the economic cycles. This 
research questions main objective is to supplement the current dialogue that the cities 
affordable housing advocates are having by presenting an analyzed list of viable 
alternatives. This list will be compiled by reviewing methods of creative financing used 
across the nation. These methods will not be constrained to affordable housing financing 
methods, but will include examples of financing for a variety of services. The main resource 
for this list will come from conversations with leaders, experts, and practitioners 
throughout the United States, but I will also research articles, journals, and other literature 
to ensure a large amount of alternatives are analyzed. By not limiting this search to our 
immediate region, the city of Atlanta will be able to learn from the mistakes and successes 
of other cities and municipalities. 
 In addition to developing a sustainable model for the Housing Opportunity Fund, the 
distribution of resources from the first bond issuance must be evaluated to determine 
whether the categories are still appropriate. The initial round was deemed successful, but 
the changing landscape of the city of Atlanta may have altered priorities in the community, 
thus the following question needs to be answered; how should the funds raised from the 
second Housing Opportunity Bond issuance be distributed? The objective of this question is to 
determine what categories the second bond issuance should be allocated to according to 
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efficiency, effectiveness, cost, or some other criteria. To determine the categories and 
criteria for evaluation, local experts in the field will be consulted with two goals. The first 
goal is to evaluate the initial disbursement of funds based off of their criteria, and the 
second is to recommend new categories and areas of focus for the next fund disbursement. 
In addition to the interviews, I will also analyze the effectiveness of the first issuance by 
reviewing the data collected by the Atlanta Development Authority. I will use simple ratios 
and calculations to compare the categories to each other. For example benefit-cost, private 
funds leveraged, time required, etc.  The focus will be on the amount of funds each 
component of the program should receive, and not where the funds should be spatially 
dispersed.  
 As stated above, the main focus of my research will be compiling opinions from 
various experts and practitioners in the Atlanta region, and across the United States. I 
currently have a list of local people I will correspond with, and will schedule our meetings in 
the near future. This list currently includes the following people, but it is expected to grow. 
Andy Schneggenburger – AHAND 
Meaghan Shannon-Vlkovic – Enterprise 
James Shelby – City of Atlanta 
David Bennett – City of Atlanta 
Peter Hayley – University Community Development 
Corp. 
Natallie Keiser – RRC 
Kate Little – G Stand 
Ernestine Garey - ADA 
 
 This list of local practitioners will pertain to part of the first and the entire second 
research question. The remaining interviews for the first research question will be 
conducted to experts across the United States. As of now I have not identified specific 
people, but will seek out those involved in financing municipality services, development 
authorities, housing authorities, and transportation authorities with the intention to learn 
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of new resources as my research continues along. I do not have a set number of people I 
would interview, rather I will continue gathering opinions as long as it is relevant to my 
research objective. 
   The extent of both sets of interviews will depend on what type of interview I will be 
conducting. If it is an in-person or over the phone I will ask questions to reach my objective, 
but allow for the interviewee to expand and comment on what they feel is necessary since 
they are the experts in this field. For email correspondence I will be more direct in my 
questioning to ensure they answer the questions I need them to. The length of the 
interviews will depend on how well they are going, but at a minimum they should last 










 The following is a preliminary list of resources that I will be reviewing for background research and to 
reach my two research objectives. 
(1977). Municipal bond financing. Practising Law Institute, New York. 
Authority, A. D. (2011). "Affordable Workforce Housing - Housing Opportunity Fund."   Retrieved July 19, 2011, 
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Lamb, R. (1980). Municipal bonds : the comprehensive review of tax-exempt securities and public finance. New 
York :, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Lamb, R. (1987). Municipal bonds. New York :, McGraw-Hill. 
 
Luke, D. J. (2008). City finding innovative ways to aid homeless, but it needs help. Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 
Atlanta. 
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 The current economic recession has created a persistent challenge for cities starting in 2007, and the 
situation will likely worsen over the next few years. Part of this challenge is due to shrinking revenues, mainly 
because of the decline in property tax receipts as a result of the depressed real estate market. According to a 
survey of 1,055 cities completed by the National League of Cities, property taxes have fallen by 3.7 percent since 
2010. Unfortunately, cities will continue to experience declining property taxes through 2013 as assessments 
follow the market. Unstable consumer confidence, rising unemployment, and declining incomes have also resulted 
in falling tax receipts. Figure 1 below displays percent changes in tax revenues. The data is from the  survey 




FIGURE 1 - SOURCE:(PAGANO, 2011) 
 Cities are forced to make extremely difficult decisions due to declining revenues. Programs are being cut, 
budgets slashed, and priorities rearranged. This scenario is occurring across the country, including the city of 
Atlanta. Currently affordable housing advocates want to issue another round of general obligation bonds to fund 
the Housing Opportunity Fund. However, the city of Atlanta is not in a position to service the debt through the 
general fund, which it has done in the past. This dilemma leads to the first research question. What options are 
available for the city of Atlanta to service the general obligation bond’s debt? The following is a review of relevant 
literature documenting what other municipalities are doing, and what people are suggesting. Many of the 
resources are about housing trust funds in general, and not limited to trust funds backed by general obligation 
bonds.  
Research Question No. 1– What Sources Can Service The General Obligation Bond’s Debt? 
 
 Funding for a city’s low-income housing effort can come from a variety of sources. General revenue, taxes, 
and outside contributions are a few popular ones, but not all sources are right for a city. For example, impact fees 
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with a slower market. Sources which are linked to the specific cities makeup will give the fund the best chance to 
succeed (Grimes, 1992).  
Another important consideration when identifying potential sources is how politically viable it is. Some 
sources may seem to be good fits at first glance, yet unrealistic due to the political power of its base.  Furthermore, 
the most politically sustainable sources of funds for any city are those that are dedicated and not subject to an 
appropriation process. Atlanta is in this current dilemma because the general fund was used as the only revenue 
source. This meant the fund’s revenue source was not dedicated, and subject to the annual appropriation process. 
Although a dedicated source is favorable, unfortunately it is not completely safe. Some states have redirected funds 
from dedicated sources for other unassociated purposes(Center for Housing Policy, 2008) 
 In 2007 the Center for Community Change conducted a survey of various cities’ housing trust funds. Part of 
their research was to determine each fund’s revenue sources, and the most common sources out of the 56 trust 
funds surveyed were developer impact fees, the general fund, and inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees. Figure 2, located 
below, displays the most widely used funding sources; others include casino revenue, excess lease fees, residual 
money from other funds, and sales tax. Another important finding from this study is how many sources each city 
used for their housing fund. Out of 56 of the funds surveyed, 37 had one source, 13 had two sources, 2 had 3 
sources, and 4 had 4 sources (Brooks, 2007). Although people would think it prudent to find as many sources as 
possible, sometimes that creates unintended obstacles. This will be discussed later. 
 
FIGURE 2: SOURCE - (BROOKS, 2007) 
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There have been two funds that have failed, one is currently in a state of “reorganization”, and another is 
experiencing a moratorium since the completion of this survey. It is highly possible that some of the other 53 funds 
are ineffective due to underfunding, but it is difficult to tell without completing extensive research. The two funds 
that have failed are the Tucson Housing Trust Fund and the Duluth Housing Investment Fund. The history of these 
funds will be reviewed in an attempt to learn from their lack of sustainability. 
Tucson Housing Trust Fund 
The Tucson Housing Trust Fund (THTF) was  established in October 2006 with support coming from the 
mayor and city council members, who understood that “good quality housing that is affordable to the average 
family is a keystone for Tucson’s future” (City of Tucson, 2011). The annual funding goal was three to five million 
dollars, which would come from property sales, rental conversion fees, and funds from other programs. The 
beginning of this program had grand ambitions. Advocates believed that the trust fund would be able to leverage 
other sources of funds and becoming self-sustaining within five years. Unfortunately these ambitions fell short. By 
2009 the fund had raised approximately $500,000, other sources were disallowed to make up for the shortfall.  
The economy played a major role trust in these trust fund failures. Conversion fees were intended to 
provide millions of dollars, but only contributed approximately $30,000 in total. Advocates worked hard to find 
other sources in light of the unviability of the original ones, but politics and lobbying prevented any progress 
(Devine, 2009). The failure of this fund can be prevented in other cities if the local market is understood.  The 
Tucson Housing Trust Fund was always vulnerable by having condo conversions as the only source of funding. Real 
estate activity would have needed to sustain a torrent pace in perpetuity for conversion fees to be a successful 
source.  
Duluth Housing Investment Fund 
 In 2005 the city of Duluth created the Duluth Housing Investment Fund, which was funded by revenue 
coming from the Fond-du-Luth Casino. In this situation the fund had approximately $500,000, and was a priority of 
the mayor. The Duluth City Council did not share the same opinion about the fund, and at one point voted to cut the 
program. Initially the motion was vetoed by Mayor Herm Bergson, but after much discussion the city council 
59 
 
eventually cut the program in the apportionment process (Kelleher, 2007). This situation is not unique when the 
funding source is open to the budgeting process. As new councils are elected and administrations change, so do the 
priorities of city hall. This example reminds cities that funding sources are rarely completely secure, and advocates 
must be vigilant in demonstrating the importance of affordable housing programs through lobbying, fostering 




 The most common source of funding for the 56 surveyed funds is a developer fee. These exactions from the 
private sector are used in approximately 38 percent of the funds. Typically these exactions are in the form of 
impact fees, more commonly known as linkage fees when referring to affordable housing, which occur when a 
municipality requires a developer to pay a “fee or exaction to compensate the government for the increase in 
facilities that will be required to service the development and the people who live there or use the developed 
facilities” (Werner, 2002). The fees are imposed when the development is platted or the building permitted at a per 
unit or per square foot basis (Frej, 2005). Linkage fees can be a great tool for communities to fund affordable 
housing efforts, but some municipalities abuse it by enforcing illegal exactions or pricing the fees too high. The 
right balance of equity is necessary for impact fees to be successful in the long run (Been, 2005). 
 
General Revenue Fund 
 The general revenue fund for a municipality can also be a source of funding for housing trust funds. The 
general fund is the principal pool of money for a municipality, and accounts for all activities which do not have a 
unique fund (City of Atlanta, 2011). Approximately 25 percent of the surveyed funds use the general fund as a 
source. Although this is a widely used source and may be relatively easy to acquire, it is highly vulnerable to cuts 
due to political whims and budgetary issues. Furthermore, this fund has been decreasing since 2007. Figure 3, 
located below, displays percent change in general fund revenue and general fund expenditures. The data is from a 




FIGURE 3 – SOURCE (PAGANO, 2011) 
Inclusionary Zoning Fees In-lieu of Units 
 The third most widely used source is fees from inclusionary zoning requirements. Generally, inclusionary 
zoning requirements mandate a certain percentage of housing units be set aside at below market rate, but a 
developer can choose to pay a set fee in-lieu of the units. Out of the surveyed funds approximately 18 percent used 
this type of source. Essentially this strategy is linking affordable housing efforts with the areas real estate activity 
by requiring developers to set aside a percentage of the units as affordable, or to pay a certain rate instead. 
Although it is ideal if the units are built within the market rate housing to create a mixed-income community, the 
in-lieu fees are important for the viability of some housing funds. As with many of the strategies, this is not immune 
to economic cycles and political transitions. Communities are often pressured into placing a moratorium on this 
policy to incentivize developers to build in their area (Center for Housing Policy, 2010).  
Suggestions for Trust Funds – San Diego Case Study 
 
Trust funds have become a popular tool for providing affordable housing in many cities, thus there are 
important lessons to be learned from other experiences. One important case study to analyze is the city of San 
Diego’s successful efforts of establishing a trust fund in the late 1980’s. The city was in desperate need of affordable 
housing support with declining federal assistance, a rising low-income population, and median home pricing twice 
as much as the national median. To make things worse the city was facing a budget shortfall of $60 million. To 
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government. The non-profit housing development sector essentially was nonexistent, and the San Diego Housing 
Commission was ineffective in meeting their goals. This was resulting in a serious issue for a large segment of San 
Diego’s population (Grimes, 1992).  
 In a fortunate turn of events, the San Diego Housing Commission hired a new executive director and 
appointed a new council member as Housing Commission Chairman. These two key players understood the 
desperate situation, and believed a housing trust fund was the best way to “make a significant dent” in the housing 
problem (Grimes, 1992). Advocates incorporated three strategies in order to implement the trust find. These were 
coalition building, framing the issue, and building consensus (Grimes, 1992).  
 The first step that advocates in San Diego took was to build a coalition of neighborhood based groups that 
could create a politically formidable. Housing commission planners educated the various groups on the potential 
impact a housing trust fund could have from a financial sense. These groups were facing funding issues, thus 
understood that a housing trust fund was “a mechanism that not only could provide low-income housing, but could 
also help stabilize their organizations, increase their influence, and fund their activities (Grimes, 1992).” Eventually 
these community groups formed the San Diego Housing Trust Fund Coalition, with the help from planners at the 
San Diego Housing Commission. This key group of people did not actively call for this commission to be formed, but 
fostered important relationships and provided research to help inform decisions. This passive approach was 
important in order to not overstep boundaries imposed from their job duties (Grimes, 1992).  
 The next issue which advocates had to confront was the anticipated ideological spin that opponents would 
put on the debate. To mitigate this, advocates attempted to change people’s perception of affordable housing from 
the idea of benefiting the “non-deserving”, to supporting the hard working middle class. Along with attempting to 
alter people’s perceptions, advocates also framed the issue in the following ways: economic development, 
jobs/housing balance, homelessness, and neighborhood revitalization (Grimes, 1992). 
 The final goal key to the success of the Sand Diego Housing Trust Fund was to build enough support. Since 
the revenue source was likely to be linked to development, the real estate industry was important group to engage. 
People involved with the process also debated how many revenue sources to target. Initially it was recommended 
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to target a wide variety of sources, believing it prudent to frame this as a community wide response instead of just 
exacting resources from the development community(Grimes, 1992). 
 In the end the revenue sources and amount of funding for the trust fund was reduced, but still represented 
a significant contribution to the housing issue. While other cities may not be able to replicate the specifics from the 
San Diego case, the successes of housing advocates is reassuring for other cities. This case study showed that with 
proper support and leadership it is possible to establish a meaningful fund even in times of political, economic, and 
organizational despair. The other lesson is how to properly mix revenue sources for a fund. It is easy to argue that 
communities should strive to find as many revenue sources as possible to ensure long term stability, but this is a 
double edged sword. In San Diego an initial proposal suggested five different revenue sources, which sounds like a 
good idea, but as communities increase the number of sources they also increase the number of opposition groups. 
This can lead to a powerful coalition with the ability to kill the entire fund. There is less opposition and sometimes 
a better chance for the program to proceed in the early stages if a limited number of sources are targeted. In the 
end there are positives and negatives to both approaches, but in San Diego the limited number of sources led to a 
lack of opposition (Grimes, 1992). Los Angeles has had a successful trust fund for some time, and suggests a 
somewhat similar tactic. However, instead of decreasing opposition the advocates in Los Angeles focused on 
building support for the fund. At the beginning stages of the process the advocates did not identify any specific 
sources. This allowed them to build support without introducing disagreements in the beginning stages (Housing 
LA / Southern California Association of Non-Profit Housing, 2004). These two strategies are about increasing the 
number of supporters, and decreasing the number of opponents. Another strategy that Los Angeles affordable 
housing advocates implemented was taking advantage of their upcoming local elections. Each candidate was given 
a survey to document their feelings on affordable housing. They were also given a tour of slums, and well-
developed affordable housing to contrast. The efforts made such an impact on the candidates that each went on 
record supporting affordable housing efforts, as well as the trust fund. 
Conclusions 
 After reviewing the reports, articles, and research on the topic there are a number of things that are clear. 
First it is evident that trust funds have continued to survive even through the recession. Out of the 56 trust funds 
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surveyed in 2007, there were only two that clearly failed. Others may be experiencing difficulties, but they are still 
surviving. This offers hope to advocates across the country that funds can survive to make a real difference in their 
community. Another important finding is that there are clearly favored sources for supporting these housing funds, 
but each type of source is not appropriate for every area. For example, some areas have the right atmosphere to 
institute inclusionary zoning, but others lack the political and community support.  Finally, it is evident that even 
during times of extreme difficulty and opposition, there are passionate people successfully finding revenue sources 
for these housing funds. These findings offer the city of Atlanta hope to revive the Housing Opportunity Fund into a 
successful program that is sustainable and resilient in the face of economic and political cycles. 
Research Question No. 2 – How should the funds be allocated? 
 
 The second research question will be to determine how the funds should be allocated to the various 
program alternatives. The initial round was deemed successful, but the changing landscape of the city of Atlanta 
may have altered priorities in the community. The objective of this question is to determine what categories the 
second allocation should focus on according to efficiency, effectiveness, cost, type of housing, targeted income 
group, and/or some other criteria. To determine how the city of Atlanta should distribute future funds, the 
previous allocation will be reviewed and local practitioners will be surveyed. Analyzing the past and understanding 
changing priorities will inform how future funds should be distributed. In addition, I will also review relevant 
literature in this section. The majority of the analysis will consist of reports from the city which detail the area’s 
needs and some national research making suggestions for local communities. 
Broad Suggestions 
 
 Identifying a city’s affordable housing needs is an important task. This will dictate how a strategy for 
funding and support will be formed. The first step is to produce an overarching theme which all efforts can lead to. 
This can be as broad as adding and preserving affordable units, and as focused as increasing homeownership rates. 
To develop this goal and focus on specific issues, advocates should conduct a needs assessment for the area (Center 
for Housing Policy, 2008). The following are other strategies which HousingPolicy.org identified as key to success. 
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1. While it may be harder to develop and implement, a comprehensive housing strategy is more likely to 
have a major impact than a narrowly focused one. 
2. An approach that addresses the full range of housing needs in the community can bring in a wider array 
of stakeholders. 
3. In addition to affordability and quality, communities may wish to consider the location and energy-
efficiency of housing. 
4. In a world of limited resources, it is important to ensure that affordable homes remain affordable over 
time. 
5. Define the problems to be addressed in ways that lead to commonality of interest. 
Source: (Center for Housing Policy, 2008) 
Affordable Housing Post-Recession 
 Since 2007 the affordable housing landscape has changed and priorities have shifted. The increase in 
foreclosures and unemployment has had a depressing impact on low-income households, exacerbating the already 
bleak affordable housing landscape in most areas. Before the recession the homeownership industry was growing 
at an unsustainable rate. Home prices were skyrocketing and lending requirements were extremely relaxed. This 
led to approximately 2.5 million foreclosures when the economy declined in 2007. The increase in foreclosures not 
only presented a new issue for advocates, it also made apparent the lack of affordable rental units (Smith, 2011). In 
2009, 7.1 million households had worst case needs, which HUD defines as “very low-income renters who do not 
receive government housing assistance and who either paid more than one-half of their income for rent or lived in 
severely inadequate conditions, or both (Steffen, 2011).” These households with worst case needs are impacted 
more by economic downturns without the proper assistance.  
It would seem that declining home prices would reduce the housing cost burden for all income levels, but 
this has not been the case over the past few years. As of 2009, over 33 percent of households were paying over 30 
percent of their income for housing, and 17 percent were spending over 50 percent. These numbers are already 
significant, and it is probable for the situation to worsen over the next few years (Joint Center For Housing Studies, 
2011). These issues “reflect the long-term rise in housing costs and the ongoing weakness in income growth in the 
bottom half of the distribution (Joint Center For Housing Studies, 2011).” This trend started in 2000, and the recent 
economic recession has only made matters worse. 
 As indicated, the recent recession has brought about devastating foreclosures which are magnifying the 
need for affordable rental units, as well as the need for stabilization and foreclosure prevention assistance. This 
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foreclosure crisis has, and will continue to have, a negative effect on communities, especially low-income 
neighborhoods that lack enough demand to absorb the increase in vacant homes. This increase results in a decline 
of property values for the surrounding neighborhood due to negative physical externalities from the vacant 
properties, as well as the discounted sales prices that real estate owned (REO) properties sell for. The lower sale 
prices effects the neighborhood because of the most common form of value determination in appraisal 
methodology. This method, known as the sales comparison approach, concludes to a value based off of comparable 
sales. Thus, artificially low sale prices from REO sales will bring typical sales prices down. Another negative impact 
is the physical results from increases in vacant properties, which tend to be blighted and havens for crime 
(Immergluck, 2011).   
To diminish these negative effects, communities can develop strategies targeting foreclosure prevention, 
mitigation of negative effects, and assisting foreclosure victims (Center for Housing Policy, 2011). The first step is 
to gather quality data on the neighborhood scale. This will allow advocates to tailor strategies for each 
neighborhood since needs will vary. Along with the number of loans and foreclosures, socioeconomic data is also 
necessary to attempt to predict the risk of foreclosure. This data will allow advocates to determine how stable a 
neighborhood is in terms of foreclosures, and the state of the housing market. Figure 4 below was developed by the 
Urban Institute for the Open Society Institute which serves as guidance for different municipalities which use this 
data. This matrix allows advocates to tailor strategies specific to neighborhoods in terms of the strength of the real 
estate market and status of foreclosures. For example in a weak market with high foreclosure rates already 
present, municipalities should consider land assemblage and demolition. 
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Figure 4: Source -  Developed by the Urban Institute for the Open Society Institute (Center for Housing 
Policy, 2011) 
 
City of Atlanta Reports 
 
A Vision for Housing in Atlanta – 2002 
 This report was prepared by a Housing Task Force commissioned by Mayor Shirley Franklin in 2002 to 
produce practical steps toward improved workforce housing. The intended audience of this report was the city of 
Atlanta, which was supposed to use the report to implement the reports vision. Mayor Shirley Franklin wanted to 
improve the availability of workforce housing within Atlanta’s “great neighborhoods”, which were identified as 
communities with “ample green space for play and relaxation, safe streets, a wide diversity of people, a network of 
pedestrian paths and sidewalks, small scale retail and restaurants, great schools, houses of worship, and workforce 
and more upper scale housing in the same neighborhood (Franklin, 2002).”   The report identified five major 
themes which make up the vision. 
1. Encourage the recent positive trend of more families and individuals moving back into the City to live. 
2. Revitalize our existing neighborhoods for our existing residents, particularly our seniors. 
3. Link our housing efforts to the other building blocks of healthy communities---quality schools, safe 
streets, parks, employment centers, and pedestrian links to retail and community service centers that 
support comfortable human interaction. 
4. Strategically target public investment in certain selected neighborhoods. 
5. Position Atlanta as a leader in creating a regional vision for housing. 
Source: (Franklin, 2002) 
To strive toward this vision the task force made six recommendations which for the most part were broad 
policy issues rather than program tactics. For example, they suggest streamlining the permitting process, utilizing 
housing resources, establishing alliances, and appointing a housing czar. However, there were a handful of focused 
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suggestions. The first is an emphasis on establishing units for working persons within the 30 to 80 percent of area 
median income, directing rental resources toward the 30 percent AMI boundary, and homeownership resources 
toward the 80 percent AMI boundary (Franklin, 2002). Figures 5 and 6 below present a more detailed look at this. 
Other suggestions form this report including land assemblage, providing infrastructure improvement assistance, 
promotion of mix-ed income housing, preservation of existing affordable units, and avoiding concentration of 
affordable units. 
   
FIGURE 5 - SOURCE: (FRANKLIN, 2002) 
 




Homeownership Stimulus Program 
Target Population 
50% and 60% of AMI
($35,600 - $42,720 for a
family of 4)
60% and 80% of AMI
($42,720-56,950 for a
family of 4)
80% and 100% of AMI




Rental Stimulus Program Target 
Population 
50% of AMI ($35,000 for a
family of 4)
 50% and 60% of AMI
($35,600 - $42,720 for a
family of 4)
60% and 80% of AMI




New Century Economic Development Plan for the City of Atlanta – 2004/2005 
This development plan was established started in 2003 with pro bono assistance from Bain and Company 
at the direction of Mayor Shirley Franklin. Its intention was to direct and inform the cities to make improvements 
in three areas; healthy neighborhoods, economic opportunity, and physical infrastructure. Within each category 
were a number of issues, one being workforce housing (The City of Atlanta and Bain & Company, 2004 & 2005). 
The ‘action items’ in this report are listed below in figure 7, but they are not a focused. While they are not programs 
which funds can be diverted to, the policy suggestions are useful. 
Action Items Owner Active 
Partners 
Launch Date Completion 
Date 
Reformate and expand the Urban 
Enterprise Zone Program 
Planning ADA Q4, 2005 Ongoing 
Implement an effective 
Inclusionary Zoning program 
Planning N/A In Process Ongoing 
Use Tax Allocation Districts and 
URFA aggressively to generate 
affordable housing 
ADA N/A In Process Ongoing 
Establish a Workforce Housing 
Trust Fund 
ADA N/A Q4, 2005 Q4, 2005 
Adopt a standardized definition 
for workforce housing 
Planning N/A Q4, 2005 Q2, 2005 
Form a City team to implement, 
monitor and report on the 
program 
Planning N/A Q3, 2005 Q4, 2005 
Figure 7: Source - (The City of Atlanta and Bain & Company, 2004 & 2005)  
  
Summary of the City of Atlanta’s 2010 -2014 Consolidated Plan –2005 
 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) mandates that each city wishing to receive 
CDBG, ESG, HOME, and HOPWA funds must submit a consolidated action plan. As HUD states, this plan must be 
prepared through “a collaborative process whereby a community establishes a unified vision for community 
development actions (City of Atlanta, 2010).” The goal of this effort is to organize community development and 
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housing efforts, avoid inefficiencies, and link various organizations goals. The consolidated plan is evaluated based 
on three goals set by HUD, which are; 
1. “Decent Housing (assistance to affordable housing for homeless and those at risk, retaining affordable 
housing, increasing availability for low/moderate income families especially for disadvantaged, 
increasing supportive housing)” 
2. “A suitable Living Environment (improving safety, livability of neighborhoods, eliminating blight, 
increasing access to public and private facilities)” 
3. “Expanded Economic Opportunities (job creation and retention for low income persons, empowerment 
and self-sufficiency)” 
Source: (City of Atlanta, 2010) 
The plan identifies a large amount of statistics and data which informs its intentions regarding affordable 
housing needs within Atlanta. One is that 1/3 of households are either “cost burdened, overcrowded or lack basic 
plumbing and kitchen facilities” as of 2003 (City of Atlanta, 2010). It also states that there is a large group of people 
that rent in overcrowded conditions. The overcrowded units are not as a result of large families; rather all family 
sizes cannot find affordable quality housing. Another aspect of the Atlanta’s affordable housing challenges is the 
housing market and recent economic recession. The unemployment rate increased significantly and foreclosures 
hit record breaking numbers for all of Atlanta, but the lower-income households were impacted the most. The 
report also states the cities intentions create mixed-income communities.  
The report also stated specific priorities with focused goals. To improve the existing housing stock the city 
intends to assist low-income homeowners with repairs and rehab, support acquisition and rehabilitation of multi-
family rental units, and assist in energy efficiency efforts. The city also intends to assist low and moderate income 
households in homeownership efforts through homebuyer education, down payment assistance, and second 




 From the literature reviewed, there are a number of strategies in which the city of Atlanta can utilize. In a 
broad sense, advocates should begin by developing a comprehensive strategy supported by quality data on 
research. In the beginning stages the strategy should not focus on specific strategies more than necessary, which 
allows the coalition to bring in as many people and organizations as possible to support the cause. More specific 
strategies include targeting at risk neighborhoods, including energy efficiency strategies, and ensure that 
preservation is a priority.  
 Most of the literature is in the form of government documents and reports from the city of Atlanta starting 
in 2002. The strategies identified focus on strengthening the affordable opportunities for rental and 
homeownership. To increase the amount of homeowners in the low-income population, the city suggests more 
homeowner education, availability of down payment assistance, and subsidizing secondary mortgages. Other 
strategies include land assemblage, mixed-income community promotion, decrease in the amount of overcrowded 
units, and provide assistance for repairs and rehabilitation. The variety of strategies from the variety of sources 
gives the city of Atlanta tangible ideas for how to set their priorities. What is essential for the city to be successful is 
to capitalize on the passionate advocates which are present. Utilizing this resource can give the city the vision 
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Expanded Research Questions and Research Design 
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 The Housing Opportunity Fund is currently approved for a second bond issuance, but the city of Atlanta is 
not in a position to pay the $1.5 million in debt servicing required. Regardless of the reason, if this opportunity 
passes the community would be forgoing approximately $40 million in funding for affordable housing, resulting in 
nearly $196 million in leveraged funds and 1,800 of completed units according to the data from the first fund 
distribution. To avoid losing out on such an impactful resource, questions need to be answered. Most importantly, 
what are the cities options to cover the debt service for the second general obligation bond issuance? It is understood 
that the city is not able to cover the debt service from the general fund, thus another source of funds will need to be 
identified. Affordable housing advocates prefer an option that is sustainable enough to survive the economic cycles. 
This research questions main objective is to supplement the current dialogue that the cities affordable housing 
advocates are having by presenting an analyzed list of viable alternatives. This list will be compiled by reviewing 
methods funding sources used across the nation. The main resource for this list will come from conversations with 
leaders, experts, and practitioners throughout the United States, but I will also research articles, journals, and other 
literature to ensure a large amount of alternatives are analyzed. By not limiting this search to our immediate 
region, the city of Atlanta will be able to learn from the mistakes and successes of other cities and municipalities. 
 In 2007 the Center for Community Change surveyed 56 housing trust funds, which provide a useful source 
for this research question. First of all it offers a number of case studies which can be used, as well as contact 
information for the funds. My intention is to contact all of the existing funds to answer my interview questions. 
This will provide a broad set of opinions to draw from. 
 In addition to developing a sustainable model for the Housing Opportunity Fund, the distribution of 
resources from the first bond issuance must be evaluated to determine whether the categories are still 
appropriate. The initial round was deemed successful, but the changing landscape of the city of Atlanta may have 
altered priorities in the community, thus the following question needs to be answered; how should the funds raised 
from the second Housing Opportunity Bond issuance be distributed? The objective of this question is to determine 
what categories the second bond issuance should be allocated to according to efficiency, effectiveness, cost, or 
some other criteria. To determine the categories and criteria for evaluation, local experts in the field will be 
consulted with two goals. The first goal is to evaluate the initial disbursement of funds based off of their criteria, 
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and the second is to recommend new categories and areas of focus for the next fund disbursement. In addition to 
the interviews, I will also analyze the effectiveness of the first issuance by reviewing the data collected by the 
Atlanta Development Authority. I will use simple ratios and calculations to compare the categories to each other. 
For example benefit-cost, private funds leveraged, time required, etc.  The focus will be on the amount of funds 
each component of the program should receive, and not where the funds should be spatially dispersed.  
 As stated above, the main focus of my research will be compiling opinions from various experts and 
practitioners in the Atlanta region, and across the United States. I currently have a list of local people I will 
correspond with, and will schedule our meetings in the near future. This list currently includes the following 
people, but it is expected to grow. I will also search for reports regarding foreclosure prevention and mitigation 
strategies. After speaking with Andy Schenggenburger, it is apparent that AHAND members believe that 
foreclosure related programs should be emphasized.  
Andy Schneggenburger – AHAND 
Meaghan Shannon-Vlkovic – Enterprise 
James Shelby – City of Atlanta 
David Bennett – City of Atlanta 
Peter Hayley – University Community Development 
Corp. 
Natallie Keiser – RRC 
Kate Little – G Stand 
Ernestine Garey – ADA 
Tracy Powell – ADA 
David Haddow – Haddow and Associates 
Edrick Harris – HJ Russell 
James Talley – Atlanta Housing Authority 
Janis Ware – Summech CDC  
Dawn Luke – ADA  
Richelle Patton – Tapestry Development Group 
Gates Dunaway – Tapestry Development Group 
Jon Toppen – Tapestry Development Group 













RESEARCH QUESTION #1 
SURVEYEES: APPROXIMATELY 56 HOUSING TRUST FUNDS FROM VARIOUS CITIES 
PROMPT:ABSTRACT 
The city of Atlanta, Georgia is currently exploring alternative funding sources for their Housing 
Opportunity Fund. In the past the general fund served as the only source for the fund, but the city wants to explore 
other alternatives for the future. My research paper includes providing suggestions for alternative funding sources, 
and to do this I am surveying practitioners from cities across the United States. A more detailed description of the 
current state of Atlanta’s Housing Opportunity Fund is attached within the email. 
This survey should only take 5 to 10 minutes.  
 
Thank you for participating.  
Are local governments in your area having MORE difficulty raising funds for affordable housing currently than they 
did 5 years ago? Please indicate 0 to 5 (0 meaning “much easier time” and 5 meaning “much harder time”). 
QUESTIONS: 
1. Are local governments in your area having MORE difficulty raising funds for affordable housing currently 
than they did 5 years ago? Please indicate 0 to 5 (0 meaning “much easier time” and 5 meaning “much 
harder time”). 
a. 1 : Much easier time 
b. 2 : Easier time 
c. 3 : About the same 
d. 4 : Harder time 
e. 5 : Much harder time  
2. If yes, then why? Please choose one or more. 
a.  Declining revenues 
b. Rising expenses 
c. Political climate 
d. Other ______ 
3. Are you aware of any local governments facing a problem funding affordable housing in today’s economy, 
but still able be successful in finding creative sources?  
a. Short Answer 
4. If so, please choose one or more from the following sources: 
a. Developer Fee 




d. Program Income 
e. Property Tax 
f. Bond 










l. Housing Excise 
Tax 
m. Leftover money 
from other funds 
n. Residential 
demolition tax 
o. Sales Tax 
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p. Use tax q. Other: __ 
5. How difficult was it to secure this source of funding? Would you recommend it to other municipalities? 
a. Short Answer 
6. Are you aware of a similar example, not limited to housing? For example storm water, transportation, parks 
etc. 
7. What funding sources do you believe are the best for funding affordable housing? 
a. Developer Fee 




d. Program Income 
e. Property Tax 
f. Bond 










l. Housing Excise 
Tax 
m. Leftover money 
from other funds 
n. Residential 
demolition tax 
o. Sales Tax 
p. Use tax 
q. Other: __ 
 
8. How many funding sources should advocates target? 
a. 1 Source 
b. 2-3 Sources 
c. 3-4 Sources 
d. 4-5 Sources 
e. 5 or more sources 
9. Why do you believe that is the ideal number of sources to target? 
a. Short Answer 
10. Does targeting more sources invite more opposition?  
11. What types of sources invite the most opposition? Please rate each source from 0 to 10 (0 meaning “no 
opposition”, and 10 meaning “insurmountable opposition”).
a. Developer Fee 




d. Program Income 
e. Property Tax 
f. Bond 










l. Housing Excise 
Tax 
m. Leftover money 
from other funds 
n. Residential 
demolition tax 
o. Sales Tax 
p. Use tax 
q. Other: __ 
 
12. What suggestions do you have for garnering the most support for a housing trust fund? 
a. Short Answer 
 
13. After learning the basics of Atlanta’s dilemma, what do you suggest as a viable option for the 
city of Atlanta to pursue? 
a. Developer Fee 
b. General fund 
c. Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees 
d. Program Income 
e. Property Tax 
f. Bond 
g. Tax Increment Financing 
h. Public/Private Investments 
i. Transient occupancy tax 
j. Condominium conversion Fee 
k. Document recording fees 
l. Housing Excise Tax 
m. Leftover money from other funds 
n. Residential demolition tax 
o. Sales Tax 
p. Use tax 
q. Other: __ 
14. Why did you suggest those sources as a viable option for Atlanta? 
a. Short Answer 
15. Can you suggest a person, organization, or local government which may be able to assist me 
in my research? 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION #2 
SURVEYEES: APPROXIMATELY 20+ HOUSING ADVOCATES/PRACTITIONERS 
PROMPT: 
In addition to developing a sustainable model for the Housing Opportunity Fund, the distribution of resources 
from the first bond issuance must be evaluated to determine whether the categories are still appropriate. The changing 
landscape of the city of Atlanta may have altered priorities in the community, thus the following question needs to be 
answered; how should the funds raised from the second Housing Opportunity Bond issuance be 
distributed? 
 
BELOW IS ALLOCATION BREAKDOWN FROM THE FIRST BOND ISSUANCE: 
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Multifamily Loans $5,500,000 ($1,300,000) $4,200,000 $1,780,000 $2,420,000 $11,886,644 282 
Single Family Loans 
(Mortgage 
Assistance) 
$5,100,905 $8,400,000 $13,510,905 $11,811,144 $1,699,761 $81,614,455 633 
Single Family Loans 
(Homebuilder 
Incentives) 
$2,000,000 ($2,000,000) $0 $0 $0 N/A 0 
AHA – HOPE VI $7,500,000 $0 $7,500,000 $7,457,214 $42,786 $26,050,536 375 





$5,000,000 ($2,800,000) $2,200,000 $1,588,ooo $612,000 $20,500,000 0 
Land Assemblage – 
Direct Land 
Acquisition 
$500,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $0 $1,000,000 $0 0 
CHDO Loans $2,845,656 ($1,900,000) $945,656 $0 $945,656 $0 0 
Interest Earnings $0 ($900,000) ($900,000) $0 ($900,000) $0 0 
Totals $28,456,561 $0 $28,456,561 $22,636,358 $5,820,202 $140,051,635 1,290 
























1. In your opinion, was the first allocation of funds successful? Please explain in one or two sentences. 
2. Please rate, from 1 (no consideration/emphasis) to 5 (highest priority) the following categories of spending 
priorities for a future bond distribution 
a. Rental units for households below 30% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
b. Rental units for households between 30% and 50% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
c. Rental units for households between 50% and 80% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
d. Rental units for households between 80% and 120% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
e. Ownership units for households below 30% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
f. Ownership units for households between 30% and 50% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
g. Ownership units for households between 50% and 80% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
h. Ownership units for households between 80% and 120% AMI. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
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i. Funding for foreclosure prevention. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
j. Funding for mitigation of negative impacts from vacant and foreclosed properties. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
k. Funding for relocation and other assistance for foreclosed homeowners. 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
l. Funding for the most cost-effective programs (maximum units per dollar of subsidy). 
i. 1 :  No consideration or funding should be allocated 
ii. 2: Low priority, only a small portion of funding should be allocated 
iii. 3:  Average priority, this category should be funded; not at a high or low level 
iv. 4: High priority, this category should be funded at a high level 
v. 5: Highest priority, this category should receive the highest proportion of funds 
m. Funding towards the programs which leverage the most private investment. 
i. Strongly Agree 
ii. Agree  
iii. Neutral 
iv. Disagree 
v. Strongly Disagree 
 
3. Please assign a percentage as to how the future allocation of funds should be divided. In addition to placing a 
percentage next to each program, please elaborate as to the decisions you made. If you believe other programs 
should be added, please assign a percentage to OTHER, and explain what that program is.  
 
a. ___ - Multifamily Loans – New Construction 
b. ___ - Multifamily Loans – Rehab 
c. ___ - Single Family Loans (Mortgage Assistance) 
d. ___ - Single Family Loans (Down payment Assistance) 
e. ___ - Single Family Builder Construction Financing (Acquisition) 
f. ___ - Single Family Builder Construction Financing (Construction) 
g. ___ - Single Family Builder Construction Financing (Rehabilitation) 
h. ___ - Land Assemblage for future affordable housing sites (Financing for acquisition, demolition, and 
land clearance) 
i. ___ - CHDO Loans (Financing part of the acquisition, construction, or renovation of housing) 
j. ___ - Seed money for Transit Oriented Development  
k. ___ - Foreclosure Prevention 
l. ___ - Mitigation of negative impacts from vacant and foreclosed properties 
m. ___ - Relocation and other assistance for foreclosed homeowners 
n. ___ - OTHER 
o. ___ - OTHER 






I. Introduction of applied research paper and topics 
a. Describe how I was introduced to the topic, and what the current issues are. 
b. Much of this body will come from the Detailed Workplan and Bibliography 
II. Literature Review 
a. The literature review is a summary of research on my two research topics. 
III. Data and Methodology 
a. Describe the data and methodology of research I used to complete the paper. 
IV. Research Question No. 1 – Source of Fund 
a. Describe current issue and need for affordable housing 
b. Discuss case studies of other cities 
c. Describe research design 
d. Present findings from interviews 
e. Analyze suggest sources 
i. Linkage Fee 
ii. Tax Increment Financing 
iii. Etc. 
f. Nexus Analysis 
V. Research Question No. 2 – New Priorities 
a. Describe current issue 
b. Discuss case studies of other cities 
c. Describe research design 
d. Present findings from interviews 




1. Interviews from national practitioners with knowledge of funding sources for local 
housing trust funds. 
2. Interviews from local practitioners with knowledge of Atlanta’s affordable housing 
needs. 
3. Interview with David Rosen of David Paul Rosen & Associates 
4. Housing Trust Fund Workbook from the Center for Community Change 




SURVEY 1 RESPONDENTS 
 
Name City State Organizations 
Katherine Cooley Citrus Heights  CA City of Citrus Heights 
Nicole Citrus Heights  CA City of Citrus Heights 
Sarah Bontrager Elk Grove  CA City of Elk Grove 
Pam Hennarty Mammoth Lakes  CA Mammoth Lakes Housing, Inc. 
Jennifer Halferty Mammoth Lakes  CA Mammoth Lakes Housing, Inc. 
Ruth Johnson 
Hopkins 
Oxnard  CA City of Oxnard's Affordable Housing  
and Rehabilitation Division 
Sue Castellucci Petaluma  CA City of Petaluma 
Lisa Luboff Santa Monica  CA City of Santa Monica Housing Division 
Cheryl Shavers Santa Monica  CA City of Santa Monica Housing Authority 
Allyne Winderman West Hollywood  CA City of West Hollywood 
Jeff Yegian Boulder  CO City of Boulder 
Kathy Fedler Longmont  CO City of Longmont, CDBG and Affordable Housing 
Office 
Randy Irwin Oskaloosa  IA Oskaloosa Housing Trust Fund 
Laura Russell Oskaloosa  IA City of Oskaloosa Housing Trust Fund 
Cary Steinbuck Chicago  IL Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust Fund 
Tracy Sanchez Chicago  IL City of Chicago - Department of Housing and 
Economic Development 
Mary C. Smith Highland Park  IL City of Highland Park, IL 
Donna Wiemann Minneapolis  MN City of Minneapolis 
Nancy Hohmann St. Louis  MO Affordable Housing Commission of the City of St. Louis 
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Randy Stallings Asheville  NC City of Asheville 
Zelleka Biermann Charlotte  NC City of Charlotte 
Michelle Mapp North Charleston  SC Lowcountry Housing Trust 
Rebecca Wade Knoxville  TN City of Knoxville, Community Development Department 
David Potter Austin  TX City of Austin/Austin Housing Finance Corporation 
Sandra Marler Salt Lake City  UT Salt Lake City Corporation 
Eric Keeler Alexandria  VA Office of Housing 
Brian Pine Burlington  VT Community & Economic Development Office 
Ken Russell Montpelier  VT City of Montpelier Community Development Agency 
Laura Hewitt 
Walker 





















Ronald Lall SouthStar CDC 
Richelle (Shelly) 
Patton 
Tapestry Development Group 
Meaghan Vlkovic Enterprise Community Partners 
Jim Wehner Charis Community Housing 
Christy (Norwood) 
Taylor 
Charis Community Housing 
Frank Alexander Emory 
Dawn J. Luke Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta 
John O'Callaghan ANDP 
Ernestine Garey Invest Atlanta 
Dan Reuter ARC 
Deirdre Oakley Georgia State University 
Dan Immergluck School of City and Regional Planning, Georgia Tech 































In 2007, the city of Atlanta approved a general obligation bond issuance to assist in the creation of 
workforce housing. Even in challenging economic times, the $13.5 million in allocated funds has  
leveraged more than $94.4million in private money and created over 1,200 units 
in quality workforce housing.  
 
In the past the general fund was the only source for the Housing Opportunity Fund, but this is 
proving to be an unreliable solution. To become a sustainable tool in incentivizing workforce 
housing in Atlanta, it is necessary to identify alternative revenue sources. This report explores the 
housing needs in Atlanta, similar issues across the country, and offers suggestions for reviving the 
Housing Opportunity Fund 
HOUSING OPPORTUNITY FUND 
ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES 
This document was completed by Michael Hellier to assist The Atlanta Housing Association of Neighborhood-based Developers with 
their decisions regarding Atlanta’s Housing Opportunity Fund. This document is also a part of an applied research paper for the Master 
of City and Regional Planning program at the Georgia Institute of Technology, under the guidance and supervision of Professor Dan 
Immergluck. 
I want to thank all who took the survey, as well as the following people for their assistance.  
Professor Dan Immergluck 
Richelle Patton 
Tracy Powell 
 David Rosen 






ATLANTA’S HOUSING NEEDS 
6,000 Homeless People  
Nearly 6,000 homeless people were counted in the city of Atlanta during the 2011 homeless census. 
HOMELESSNESS 
On January 25 2011, a homeless census was completed. These were some of the results. 
1 out of 3 were in Unsheltered Locations 
1 out of 3  homeless people counted that night were in unsheltered locations. 
AFFORDABILITY 
Housing affordability continues to be a real problem for the city of Atlanta. 
47% cannot afford a two-bedroom unit 
47% of renter households in the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta HMFA do not earn sufficient income to 
afford a two-bedroom unit at Fair Market Rent. 
1 out of 4 pay 50%+ of income to housing 
26.4% of renters in the city of Atlanta pay 50% or more of their household income to housing. This is higher than 
Charlotte, Raleigh, Nashville, Dallas, Houston, the South Region, Georgia, and the United States. 
POVERTY AND INCOME 
Poverty is rising, income is falling, and Atlanta trails the county in economic recovery. 
INCOME DECLINED BY 20.7% Since 2000 
Real median household income declined by 20.7% since from 2000 to 2010. 
40.7% of CITIZENS ARE DEEMED POOR OR STRUGGLING 
The U.S. Census Bureau considers any person earning less than twice the poverty level to be poor or struggling. 
This is higher than Charlotte, Raleigh, Nashville, the South Region, Georgia, and the United States. 
Source : The 2011 Metro Atlanta Tri-Jurisdictional Collaborative Continuum of Care Homeless Census 
Source : Out of Reach—National Low Income Housing Coalition; and Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau ACS 2006 to 2010 (5-year estimates) 








 HOF:AN IMPORTANT TOOL 
Funds were provided as gap financing for public 
infrastructure improvements at the Ashley at Collegetown 
development in the West End neighborhood. This is a 
redevelopment of the public housing  formerly known as 
Harris Homes. 
AHA Allocation 
The Housing Opportunity Fund proved to be an important 
resource for Community Housing Development Organizations. 
For example, University Community Development Corporation 
used the funding for major rehabilitation of two single-family 
homes in the Ashview Heights and West End neighborhoods. 
CHDO Allocation 
Various multi-family developments have received 
funding from the Housing Opportunity Fund, 
including the Adamsville Green Senior 
development, and the Amal Heights Apartments. 
Multifamily Loan Allocation 
The Housing Opportunity Fund provided 
mortgages and down payment assistance. This 
program was an important resource for 
homebuyers in the city of Atlanta. 
Single-Family Home Loan Allocation 
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The following graphs display the impact of the 
Housing Opportunity Fund thus far  
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RESULTS OF SURVEY 
At the end of 2011 a survey was conducted asking various 
questions about affordable housing trust funds to 
practitioners throughout the United States. A list of these 
practitioners are included in the addendum. The 
responses, input, and opinions received has informed the 
research and recommendations.  
Atlanta’s current situation is not unique. Cities 
throughout the United States are having to make difficult 
decisions about what services they can provide, and too 
often affordable housing programs are targets for funding 
cuts. This can be seen in a recent court ruling in 
California, which affirmed that the state could close over 
400 redevelopment authorities in an effort to close the 
state’s budget gap. These redevelopment authorities were 
critical in building and preserving affordable housing.  
With events similar to this occurring across the country, it 
is unsurprising that respondents to the survey 
overwhelmingly indicated that it is more difficult to raise 
funds for affordable housing in 2011 then it was in 2006. 
Forty eight percent felt that it has been a harder time, and 
thirty five percent felt that it has been a much harder 
time.  
According to a 2011 survey of 1,055 cities completed by 
the National League of Cities, property taxes have fallen 
by 3.7 percent since 2010. Unfortunately, cities will 
continue to experience declining property taxes through 
2013 as assessments follow the market (Pagano, 2011). 
This is particularly harmful for affordable housing efforts 
that receive funding based off of development activity, 
which many housing trust funds do. Furthermore, local 
governments are competing for the little development 
that is taking place by decreasing, deferring, or 
eliminating fees, which has historically funded affordable 
housing efforts. Unstable consumer confidence, rising 
unemployment, and declining incomes have also resulted 
in falling tax receipts. This trend can be seen in this survey 
as well. When asked the reason for increased difficulty in 
raising funds for affordable housing, 48% stated declining 
revenues, 33% stated the political climate, and 19% 
stated rising expenses. 
Table 3 is a compilation of other responses given by the 
respondents. These are not as impactful as declining 
revenue, rising expenses, and the political climate, but 
still contribute to the increased difficulty  as well. 
Figure 3 
Table 3 - Other reasons for increased 
difficulty 
 Lack of administrative funding to administer programs 
 Federal policies disallowing new rental vouchers 
 Increasing competition and restrictions for funds 
 Increased need for affordable housing 
 Private sector is having a difficult time securing debt 
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 RESULTS OF SURVEY, CONT’D 
NUMBER OF SOURCES TO TARGET 
Respondents to the survey identified a number of things to consider when pursing potential revenue sources. The first is to target a large and 
diverse group of sources to mitigate the risks of losing one or two. The current economic times are making this more and more apparent. It is 
also easier to secure smaller amounts of funds from a variety of sources, rather than large amounts of funds from a few. Conversely, some 
respondents felt that limiting the amount of sources targeted is a wise decision. First of all, it limits the amount of opponents to the trust fund, 
assuming the industry targeted as a revenue source opposes it. Furthermore, respondents felt that trying to coordinate a large amount of sources 
can become confusing, complicated, and sometimes counterproductive.  
The majority of respondents felt that targeting 3-4 sources provided the right balance. However, it is apparent that each city will have a 
somewhat unique experience when it comes to identifying revenue sources.  
SOURCES WITH THE GREATEST OPPOSITION 
Respondents were asked to rate a list of 
revenue sources in terms of opposition. 1 
meaning no opposition, and 10 meaning 
insurmountable opposition. The steps used to 
calculate each sources score is shown below 
the figure. Clearly respondents feel that 
attempting to use a property or sales tax 
would be extremely difficult, especially in 
the current economic times. It is interesting 
to note that property tax and sales tax both 
had four respondents choose insurmountable 
opposition, and the general fund, use tax, 
and inclusionary zoning in-lieu fees each had 
two.  
Example—Property Tax            
Weight 1 - No 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 - Insurmountable  
Number of Respondents  0 0 1 0 1 2 3 2 7 4  






 ATLANTA’S OPTIONS 
The city of Atlanta needs to decide what revenue sources to use for the Housing Opportunity Fund. As discussed earlier, the city of Atlanta will 
not continue to service the debt for another general obligation bond (GO Bond) issuance. With this knowledge, there are two general alternatives 
to take. 
OPTION 1: Identify sources to service the GO Bond debt service 
The city of Atlanta can decide to utilize general obligation bonds to fund the Housing Opportunity Fund. This would allow the trust fund to be 
adequately filled in the early stages, but require debt service to be paid back over the life of the bonds. Since the debt service will be a consistent 
figure, it is necessary that the revenue sources used to pay it be consistent as well. This requirement limits what revenue sources can be used. A 
suitable amount of consistency is provided if a property tax, sales tax, or the general fund is used, but the other sources have the potential for such 
high annual variation that it may be difficult support a general obligation bond issuance. The following table displays what revenue sources are 
capable, or may be capable, for servicing the debt. 
Table 5 - GO Bond Supportable 
General Fund Yes 
Property Tax Yes 
Sales Tax Yes 
TIF/TAD Yes 
Transient Occupancy Tax Possibly 
Document Recording Fee Possibly 
Developer Fee Possibly 
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu Fees Unlikely 
OPTION 2: Identify revenue sources without using a GO Bond Issuance 
The other option available is raise funds without using a general obligation bond issuance. There are many reasons for doing this. The uncertain 
nature of the current bond market, the lack of debt service options, and the necessity to advocate for another bond issuance every few years. 
Choosing a different method to fund the trust fund provides greater stability and flexibility that increases the chance of sustainability. However, the 
annual funds available will be much lower. The revenue sources available using this method will still be limited due to a number of factors, but not 
as limited as the above option. 
 
 
The following pages will go over each option and the revenue sources involved. Then suggestions will be made as to what option to choose and 
what revenue sources to pursue. Revenue projections will be estimated using available data. 
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Political Viability in Atlanta 




General Fund Yes 
Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has made it 
clear that they will not use the general fund 
for debt servicing. 
N/A N/A 
Property Tax Yes 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents 
rated a property tax as the revenue source 
with the most opposition. 




relatively low.  
Very High: The 
potential annual 
amount is very 
high when 
compared to other 
sources. 
Sales Tax Yes 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents 
rated a sales tax as the revenue source with 
the second most opposition. 
High: Year to year 
changes in sales tax 
receipts are 
relatively low.  
High: The 
potential annual 
amount is high 
when compared 
to other sources. 
TIF/TAD Yes 
Probable: Atlanta has a successful history 













Possible: This is not an impossible source 
to acquire, but it will invite opposition 
from the business community. 
Low: Real estate 
market variations 
have been high in 
recent years. 









Possible: This is not an impossible source 
to acquire, but it will invite opposition 
from the business community. 
Low: Real estate 
market variations 




from this source 
has the potential 





Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has 
explored this method before, but talks 
ended due to immense opposition and the 




OPTION 2: IDENTIFY REVENUE SOURCES WITHOUT USING A GO BOND 
 Political Viability in Atlanta Year to Year Stability Funding Potential 
General Fund 
Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has made it clear that they will not 
use the general fund. 
N/A N/A 
Property Tax 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents rated a property tax as 
the revenue source with the most opposition. 
High: Year to year changes in 
property tax receipts are 
relatively low.  
Very High: The potential 
annual amount is very high 
when compared to other 
sources. 
Sales Tax 
Highly Unlikely: The survey respondents rated a sales tax as the 
revenue source with the second most opposition. 
High: Year to year changes in 
sales tax receipts are relatively 
low.  
High: The potential annual 
amount is high when 
compared to other sources. 
TIF/TAD 
Probable: Atlanta has a successful history using Tax Allocation 
Districts. 
Low: Revenue from Atlanta’s 
current TAD’s have seen large 
annual variations 
High: The potential amount 
in a good year is high. 
Document Recording 
Fee 
Possible: This is not an impossible source to acquire, but it will 
invite opposition from the business community. 
Low: Real estate market 
variations have been high in 
recent years. 
Low:  Revenue Projections 
using typical recording fees 
are relatively low. 
Developer Fee 
Possible: This is not an impossible source to acquire, but it will 
invite opposition from the business community. 
Low: Real estate market 
variations have been high in 
recent years. 
High: The projected revenue 
from this source has the 
potential to be substantial. 
Inclusionary Zoning In-
lieu Fees 
Prohibitive: The city of Atlanta has explored this method before, 





Possible: There would be nothing to prohibit this revenue source, 
but it is difficult to rely on.  
Low: Annual variation will 
likely be high due to the 
uncertain nature of 
philanthropic funds. 
Low: Potential funding from 
this source will likely be 
relatively low. 
Leftover Money From 
Other Funds 
Unlikely: It is unlikely that affordable housing efforts would have 
priority for these funds in Atlanta. 
Low: High variation and 
uncertainty. 
Low: If these funds are 
secured, they will likely be 
relatively minor. 
Program Income 
Very Likely: Income generated from the trust fund is desired by 
the city 
Low: Program income will 
fluctuate due to the nature of  
the financial mechanisms 
Low: Program income will 
be low, if existent at all 
Condominium 
Conversion Fee 
Very Unlikely: In 2009 there was one condominium conversion 
permit in the city of Atlanta. In 2008 there were three, and in 
2007 there were three. It is unlikely activity will pick up in the 
near future.  
Low: Condominium 
conversions in the past decade 
were extremely volatile year to 
year. In absolute terms, year to 
year change averaged 90 
percent. 
Low: Fees exacted from 
condominium conversions 




Analysis and Projections  
for  




 REAL ESTATE DOCUMENT/RECORDING FEE 
Description 
 
A fee charged on real estate documents recorded.  It can be based 
on property  value, a flat fee, or based on pages recorded. 
Range of Assessments 
Many jurisdictions use recording fees, and the exaction percentage 
varies. This analysis utilizes a range of assessments from .025% 
to .1% 
Who is Burdened? Grantors of real property will be burdened by this fee. 
Bond Repayment Viability Possible 
Table 7 - Recording Fee Sensitivity Analysis 
 Total Sales 0.025% 0.05% 0.075% 0.10% 
2005  $10,370,235,650   $2,592,559   $5,185,118   $7,777,677   $10,370,236  
2006  $14,288,131,823   $3,572,033   $7,144,066   $10,716,099   $14,288,132  
2007  $13,953,647,674   $3,488,412   $6,976,824   $10,465,236   $13,953,648  
2008  $6,199,917,782   $1,549,979   $3,099,959   $4,649,938   $6,199,918  
2009  $4,289,894,755   $1,072,474   $2,144,947   $3,217,421   $4,289,895  






$6.02 MILLION   
Projecting revenue for this source is more straightforward relative to 
linkage fees and tax increment financing. It is generally a percentage of 
the consideration, or sale price, for each transaction. Some 
jurisdictions limit what types of transactions are subject to this 
transaction by location, amount of consideration, and use. 
Figure 5 displays the total amount of considerations for transactions in 
the city of Atlanta from 2005 to 2010. The volatile nature of this 
source can be seen, especially when looking at data from 2005 to 2010. 
Table 7 below is an attempt to project revenue based on historical sale 
figures and a range of assessments from .025% to .1%. It is important 
to understand that these numbers are based off the top and 
bottom of the past real estate cycle.  
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 LINKAGE FEE 
Description 
 
When a municipality requires a developer to pay a fee to compensate the government for the 
increase in services needed for the proposed development. Linkage fees can be a great tool for 
communities to fund affordable housing efforts, and a majority of other trust funds use this as a 
major source of funding.  
Current Use in Atlanta Building permits are currently assessed at the rate of $5.00 per $1,000 of total construction 
value with a minimum fee of $50. A building permit is required “to construct, erect, demolish, 
install, alter or repair…any building, structure, equipment, appliances or system…”  
Examples Boston, MA— $5.00 per square foot 
San Francisco, CA—$7.05 per square foot 
Sacramento, CA—Range from $.27 to $.99 per square foot according to use 
Berkeley, CA—$2.00 to $4.00 per square foot according to use 
San Diego, CA—$.26 to $1.06 per square foot according to use 
Cambridge, MA—$3.00 per square foot 
Who is Burdened? Can be viewed as a hindrance to commercial development. 
Legal Requires a vote 
Bond Repayment Viability Possible 
Figure 6 displays the potential revenue projections from 2004 to 2009 if a linkage fee were used. The fees assigned to each property use are based on San Diego 
and Sacramento. It is important to not that this is a very rough estimate, and that these numbers are based off the top and bottom of the past real estate 
cycle. The following assumptions explain how these figures were reached.  
 Permitting data with construction cost of the work done was obtained, but not the square footage of the work done. Thus, to estimate the square footage 
the following construction costs were assumed. Office—$150/sf ; Hotel—$150/sf ; Commercial—$90/sf ; Industrial—$50/sf. There is obvious 
problems with these assumptions, including quality of building and costs changing over time, but to estimate revenue projections it is necessary to have the 
size of the permits. 
 Commercial uses include mercantile buildings, restaurants, businesses, and gas stations 
 Industrial uses include warehouses, office/warehouses, and industrial. The permitting department does not categorize manufacturing buildings by itself, 
which will have a higher construction cost. 






$32.33 MILLION   
17 
 
 TAX ALLOCATION DISTRICTS / TAX INCREMENT FINANCING  
Description 
 
When a Tax Allocation District is established, the amount of prop-
erty tax revenue is recorded based on the assessment prior to any 
development. A municipality then makes capital improvements, or 
subsidizes a developer to do so. The base amount continues to be 
used to fund city services, but any increase due to rising property 
values would be captured for the Housing Opportunity Fund. 
Current Use and History in Atlanta There are currently 10 TAD’s in Atlanta.  
 
Examples Atlantic Station; BeltLine; Campbellton Road; Eastside; Hollowell/
ML King; Metropolitan Parkway; Perry-Bolton; Princeton Lakes; 
Stadium Area; Westside 
Range of Assessments Varies from project to project 
Who is Burdened? Varies from project to project 
Legal Approval to establish a TAD must be obtained from all governments 
with tax authority within the district (City, County, and school) in 
order to use all portions of property tax revenues.  
Considerations/Fairness Delays tax revenue to taxing entities for a period of time. Bond 
market is weak, thus new TAD’s will be rare in the short term. 
Bond Repayment Viability 
 
High 
Due to the nature of Tax Increment Financing/Tax Allocation 
Districts, it is difficult to project the potential revenue for this source. 
Figure 7 however displays the total source balance for Atlanta TAD’s 
from 2004 to 2010. This is the total remaining funds from all TAD’s at 
the end of each year  
Any revenue obtained from this source for the Housing Opportunity 
Fund would most likely be required to be allocated back into the same 








REVENUE SOURCE OPTIONS 
Due to the general obligation bond method’s inflexibility and instability, it is recommended to target revenue sources that can feed into the 
Housing Opportunity Fund on an annual basis. This will allow longevity for the fund, which it currently does not have. As of now, the City must 
agree to issue and pay the debt service on general obligation bonds each time the fund runs out, and its apparent now that this is not sustainable.  
Through the research and surveys completed, the city should begin targeting linkage fees, document recording fees, and funds from tax 
increment financing/tax allocation districts. These sources have relatively high viability in Atlanta, sustainability, and potential magnitude. As 
discussed earlier it is recommended to target 3 to 4 sources. This will provide a diverse base that will increase the probability for a sustainable 
trust fund. 
Other sources to target include program income, leftover funds from other programs, and philanthropic funds. 
 
OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER 
 Identify potential revenue sources that may not be apparent as of now. The discussions for the new Atlanta Falcons football stadium may 
present an opportunity. The surrounding community should have a seat at the table in the negotiations for this proposal, and it may be 
useful to leverage this. If they are not doing so already, they might develop a community benefits agreement (CBA). This agreement could 
include provisions for the developers of the stadium to invest in the Housing Opportunity Fund. 
 Invite the business community into the conversation early in the process. This way they can be a part of the research and understand the 
needs of the community. It also creates a diverse coalition, which can help in overcoming strong opposition. 
 Convey that this is a vital service for the community, and utilize personal stories so people can see beyond the numbers and policies. 
 Involve low-income communities, schools, non-profit organizations, community advocacy groups, and religious institutions. These groups 
will be strong advocates for the cause. 
 Control the conversation so it is understood as adding a value to the community. 
 Link affordable housing to economic growth. Research shows that the increase of affordable housing in an area results in increases 
investment and spending in the region, provides revenue for local governments, and lowers the probability of foreclosures (Center for 







Center for Housing Policy. (2011). The Role of Affordable Housing in Creating Jobs and 
Stimulating Local Economic Development.  
Pagano, M (2011). City Fiscal Conditions in 2011. In National League of Cities (Ed.), Research 







Urban Residential Finance Authority of COA (CU_URFA) 
Housing Opportunity Program-Taxable Revenue Bonds (2007A) 
As of Apr 11, 2007 through Maturity 
Period 
Principal Coupon Interest Debt Service 
Annual Debt 
Ending Service 
1-Dec-07 625,000 5.07% 1,290,616 1,915,616 1,915,616 
1-Jun-08   952,125 952,125  
1-Dec-08 990,000 5.07% 952,125 1,942,125 2,894,249 
1-Jun-09   927,038 927,038  
1-Dec-09 1,040,000 5.07% 927,038 1,967,038 2,894,076 
1-Jun-10   900,684 900,684  
1-Dec-10 1,095,000 5.07% 900,684 1,995,684 2,896,369 
1-Jun-11   872,937 872,937  
1-Dec-11 1,150,000 5.07% 872,937 2,022,937 2,895,874 
1-Jun-12   843,796 843,796  
1-Dec-12 1,210,000 5.14% 843,796 2,053,796 2,897,592 
1-Jun-13   812,711 812,711  
1-Dec-13 1,275,000 5.18% 812,711 2,087,711 2,900,423 
1-Jun-14   779,702 779,702  
1-Dec-14 1,345,000 5.24% 779,702 2,124,702 2,904,403 
1-Jun-15   744,476 744,476  
1-Dec-15 1,415,000 5.28% 744,476 2,159,476 2,903,952 
1-Jun-16   707,134 707,134  
1-Dec-16 1,490,000 5.32% 707,134 2,197,134 2,904,268 
1-Jun-17   667,515 667,515  
1-Dec-17 1,575,000 5.35% 667,515 2,242,515 2,910,030 
1-Jun-18   625,400 625,400  
1-Dec-18 1,665,000 5.66% 625,400 2,290,400 2,915,799 
1-Jun-19   578,297 578,297  
1-Dec-19 1,760,000 5.66% 578,297 2,338,297 2,916,593 
1-Jun-20   528,506 528,506  
1-Dec-20 1,865,000 5.66% 528,506 2,393,506 2,922,013 
1-Jun-21   475,745 475,745  
1-Dec-21 1,970,000 5.66% 475,745 2,445,745 2,921,491 
1-Jun-22   420,014 420,014  
1-Dec-22 2,085,000 5.66% 420,014 2,505,014 2,925,028 
1-Jun-23   361,029 361,029  
1-Dec-23 2,210,000 5.80% 361,029 2,571,029 2,932,059 
1-Jun-24   296,917 296,917  
1-Dec-24 2,340,000 5.80% 296,917 2,636,917 2,933,835 
1-Jun-25   229,034 229,034  
1-Dec-25 2,480,000 5.80% 229,034 2,709,034 2,938,068 
1-Jun-26   157,089 157,089  
1-Dec-26 2,630,000 5.80% 157,089 2,787,089 2,944,178 
1-Jun-27   80,793 80,793  
1-Dec-27 2,785,000 5.80% 80,793 2,865,793 2,946,586 
 TOTAL 35,000,000   25,212,502 60,212,502 60,212,502 
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Name City State Organizations 
Katherine Cooley Citrus Heights  CA City of Citrus Heights 
Nicole Citrus Heights  CA City of Citrus Heights 
Sarah Bontrager Elk Grove  CA City of Elk Grove 
Pam Hennarty Mammoth Lakes  CA Mammoth Lakes Housing, Inc. 
Jennifer Halferty Mammoth Lakes  CA Mammoth Lakes Housing, Inc. 
Ruth Johnson 
Hopkins 
Oxnard  CA 
City of Oxnard's Affordable Housing  
and Rehabilitation Division 
Sue Castellucci Petaluma  CA City of Petaluma 
Lisa Luboff Santa Monica  CA City of Santa Monica Housing Division 
Cheryl Shavers Santa Monica  CA City of Santa Monica Housing Authority 
Allyne Winderman West Hollywood  CA City of West Hollywood 
Jeff Yegian Boulder  CO City of Boulder 
Kathy Fedler Longmont  CO City of Longmont, CDBG and Affordable Housing Office 
Randy Irwin Oskaloosa  IA Oskaloosa Housing Trust Fund 
Laura Russell Oskaloosa  IA City of Oskaloosa Housing Trust Fund 
Cary Steinbuck Chicago  IL Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust Fund 
Tracy Sanchez Chicago  IL 
City of Chicago - Department of Housing and Economic 
Development 
Mary C. Smith Highland Park  IL City of Highland Park, IL 
Donna Wiemann Minneapolis  MN City of Minneapolis 
Nancy Hohmann St. Louis  MO Affordable Housing Commission of the City of St. Louis 
Randy Stallings Asheville  NC City of Asheville 
Zelleka Biermann Charlotte  NC City of Charlotte 
Michelle Mapp North Charleston  SC Lowcountry Housing Trust 
Rebecca Wade Knoxville  TN City of Knoxville, Community Development Department 
David Potter Austin  TX City of Austin/Austin Housing Finance Corporation 
Sandra Marler Salt Lake City  UT Salt Lake City Corporation 
Eric Keeler Alexandria  VA Office of Housing 
Brian Pine Burlington  VT Community & Economic Development Office 
Ken Russell Montpelier  VT City of Montpelier Community Development Agency 
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The city of Atlanta is currently exploring alternative funding sources for their Housing Opportunity Fund. 
In the past the general fund served as the only source for the fund, but the city wants to explore other 
alternatives for the future. My research paper includes providing suggestions for alternative funding 
sources, and to do this I am surveying practitioners from cities across the United States. A more detailed 
description of the current state of Atlanta’s Housing Opportunity Fund is contained within the email. 
 
This survey will only take 5 to 10 minutes.  
 
Thank you for participating.  
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2. City, State 
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* 
4. Are local governments in your area having MORE difficulty raising funds for 
affordable housing currently than they did 5 years ago? Please indicate 1 to 5 (1 
meaning “much easier time” and 5 meaning “much harder time”). 
1 : Much easier time 
2 : Easier time 
3 : About the same 
4 : Harder time 
5 : Much harder time 
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6. Are you aware of any local governments facing a problem funding affordable 
housing in today’s economy, but still able to find creative funding sources? 
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Tax Increment Financing 
Public/Private Investments 
Transient occupancy tax 
Condominium conversion 
Fee 
Document recording fees 
Housing Excise Tax 
Leftover money from other 
funds 
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8. How difficult was it to secure this source of funding? Would you recommend it to 
other municipalities? 
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9. Are you aware of a similar example, not limited to housing? For example storm 
water, transportation, parks etc. 
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Best Sources for Funding Affordable Housing 
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10. What funding sources do you believe are the best for funding affordable housing 
in this climate? 
Developer Fee 
General fund 
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Other (please specify)  
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Number of Funding Sources 
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13. Why do you believe that is the ideal number of sources to target? 
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14. Does targeting more sources invite more opposition? 
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15. What types of sources invite the most opposition? Please rate each source from 0 
to 10 (0 meaning “no opposition”, and 10 meaning “insurmountable opposition”). 
  
No 
Opposition         
Insurmountable 
Opposition 
Developer Fee           
General fund           
Inclusionary Zoning In-
lieu fees           
Program Income           
Property Tax           
Bond           
Tax Increment 
Financing           
Public/Private 
Investments           
Transient occupancy 
tax           
Condominium 
conversion Fee           
Document recording 
fees           
Housing Excise Tax           
Leftover money from 
other funds           
Residential demolition 
tax           
Sales Tax           
Use tax           
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16. What suggestions do you have for garnering the most support for a housing trust 
fund? 
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17. After learning the basics of Atlanta’s dilemma, what do you suggest as a viable 
option for the city of Atlanta to pursue? 
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19. Can you suggest a person, organization, or local government which may be able 
to assist in this research? 
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Created November 2, 2011 5:53 PM
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Q1. Name









Q3. Name of Organization




Q4. Are local governments in your area having MORE difficulty raising funds for affordable
housing currently than they did 5 years ago? Please indicate 1 to 5 (1 meaning “much easier
time” and 5 meaning “much harder time”).
Answer Options Response PercentResponse Count
Harder time 48.3%  14.00
Much harder time 34.5%  10.00
About the same 13.8%  4.00
Much easier time 3.4%  1.00
Easier time 0.0%  -
Sheet1




Q5. If yes, then why? Please choose one or more.
Answer Options Response PercentResponse Count
Declining revenues 75.9% 22 47.83%
Rising expenses 31.0% 9 19.57%
Political climate 55.2% 15 32.61%
Comments 11
answered question 29 46
skipped question 1
Q6. Are you aware of any local governments facing a problem
funding affordable housing in today’s economy, but still able to find
creative funding sources?




Q7. If so, what funding sources were used? Please choose one or more from the following list:
Answer Options Response PercentResponse Count
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees 50.0% 9
Developer Fee 38.9% 7
Tax Increment Financing 38.9% 7
General fund 38.9% 7
Public/Private Investments 27.8% 5
Program Income 22.2% 4
Bond 22.2% 4
Property Tax 11.1% 2
Transient occupancy tax 11.1% 2
Housing Excise Tax 11.1% 2
Sheet1
page 3 of 8
Condominium conversion Fee 5.6% 1
Document recording fees 5.6% 1
Leftover money from other funds 5.6% 1
Residential demolition tax 5.6% 1
Sales Tax 5.6% 1




Q8. How difficult was it to secure this source of funding? Would you recommend it to other municipalities?




Q9. Are you aware of a similar example, not limited to housing? For example storm water, transportation, parks etc.




Q10. What funding sources do you believe are the best for funding affordable housing in this climate?
Revenue Sources Response PercentResponse Count
Residential demolition tax 0% 18
Property Tax 4% 12
Condominium conversion Fee 4% 11
General fund 8% 10
Housing Excise Tax 8% 7
Sales Tax 8% 7
Use tax 8% 6
Sheet1
page 4 of 8
Leftover money from other funds 12% 4
Transient occupancy tax 15% 3
Program Income 23% 2
Developer Fee 27% 2
Document recording fees 27% 2
Bond 39% 2
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees 42% 1
Public/Private Investments 46% 1









Q12. How many funding sources should advocates target?
Answer Options Response PercentResponse Count
3-4 Sources 33.3% 7
2-3 Sources 23.8% 5
5 or more sources 23.8% 5
4-5 Sources 14.3% 3
1 Source 4.8% 1
answered question 21
skipped question 9
Q13. Why do you believe that is the ideal number of sources to target?
Answer Options Response Count
Sheet1




Q14. Does targeting more sources invite more opposition?




Q15. What types of sources invite the most opposition? Please rate each source from 0 to 10 (0 meaning “no opposition”, and 10 meaning “insurmountable opposition”).
Answer Options No Opposition Insurmountable OppositionRating AverageResponse Count
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Income 8 3 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 56 3.11 18
Public/Private Investments 2 5 5 1 4 0 1 1 1 0 75 3.75 20
Transient occupancy tax 1 3 0 2 0 3 2 2 2 0 81 5.4 15
Leftover money from other funds 3 1 3 0 6 1 2 0 2 0 82 4.56 18
Condominium conversion Fee 0 1 2 2 5 3 0 1 2 0 85 5.31 16
Residential demolition tax 0 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 0 86 5.38 16
Tax Increment Financing 1 4 2 0 6 1 3 2 1 0 97 4.85 20
Housing Excise Tax 0 0 1 1 5 3 1 2 3 0 100 6.25 16
Document recording fees 0 2 2 2 4 2 1 0 5 0 102 5.67 18
Bond 1 4 2 2 2 2 4 3 1 0 106 5.05 21
Developer Fee 3 0 1 2 1 3 3 2 3 1 111 5.84 19
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees 0 2 0 1 4 1 2 1 5 2 121 6.72 18
Use tax 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 6 3 2 125 7.35 17
General fund 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 3 5 2 140 7.37 19
Sales Tax 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 4 5 4 143 7.94 18
Property Tax 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 2 7 4 160 8 20
160 answered question 21
No Opposition Insurmountable Oppositionskipped question 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Property Tax 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 2 7 4 160
1 x 0 2 x 0 3x 1 4 x 0 5x 1 6 x 2 7 x 3 8 x 2 9 x 7 10 x 4
Sheet1
page 6 of 8
Q16. What suggestions do you have for garnering the most support for a housing trust fund?




Q17. After learning the basics of Atlanta’s dilemma, what do you suggest as a viable option for the city of Atlanta to pursue?
Answer Options Response PercentResponse Count
Housing Excise Tax 0% 0
Property Tax 5% 1
Condominium conversion Fee 5% 1
Residential demolition tax 5% 1
Sales Tax 5% 1
Use tax 5% 1
Developer Fee 10% 2
Transient occupancy tax 10% 2
General fund 19% 4
Program Income 19% 4
Bond 24% 5
Document recording fees 24% 5
Leftover money from other funds 24% 5
Inclusionary Zoning In-lieu fees 38% 8
Tax Increment Financing 43% 9





Answer Options Response Count
21
Sheet1
page 7 of 8
answered question 21
skipped question 9
Q19. Can you suggest a person, organization, or local government which may be able to assist in this research?
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1. Name: 
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Graduate Student Research : Priorities for Atlanta's Housing Opportunity
4. Please rate, from 1 (no consideration/emphasis) to 5 (highest priority) the following 
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Graduate Student Research : Priorities for Atlanta's Housing Opportunity
5. Please assign a percentage as to how the future allocation of funds should be 
divided. In addition to placing a percentage next to each program, please elaborate as to 
the decisions you made. If you believe other programs should be added, please assign a 
percentage to OTHER, and explain what that program is.  
 
Below shows the data from the first Housing Opportunity Fund allocation. Figure 1 is the 
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Graduate Student Research : Priorities for Atlanta's Housing Opportunity
6. If you believe other programs should be added, please explain what that program is and 
assign a percentage. 
 
7. If you believe a category above is only partly accurate, please explain here. 
 
For example: If you agree that land assemblage for future affordable housing sites should 






































1 Feb 18, 2012 1:54 AM Ronald Lall
2 Feb 17, 2012 9:21 PM Richelle (Shelly) Patton
3 Feb 16, 2012 4:11 PM Meaghan Vlkovic
4 Feb 14, 2012 8:36 PM Jim Wehner
5 Feb 14, 2012 5:13 PM Christy (Norwood) Taylor
6 Feb 14, 2012 3:08 PM Frank Alexander
7 Feb 13, 2012 9:52 PM Dawn J. Luke
8 Feb 13, 2012 9:01 PM John O'Callaghan
9 Feb 13, 2012 8:34 PM Ernestine Garey
10 Feb 13, 2012 4:59 PM Dan Reuter
11 Feb 13, 2012 4:14 PM Deirdre Oakley
12 Feb 13, 2012 3:02 PM Dan Immergluck
13 Feb 13, 2012 2:54 PM Natallie Keiser













1 Feb 18, 2012 1:54 AM SouthStar CDC
2 Feb 17, 2012 9:21 PM Tapestry Development Group
3 Feb 16, 2012 4:11 PM Enterprise Community Partners
4 Feb 14, 2012 8:36 PM Charis Community Housing
5 Feb 14, 2012 5:13 PM Charis Community Housing
skipped question
Graduate Student Research : Priorities for 









6 Feb 14, 2012 3:08 PM Emory
7 Feb 13, 2012 9:52 PM Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta
8 Feb 13, 2012 9:01 PM ANDP
9 Feb 13, 2012 8:34 PM Invest Atlanta
10 Feb 13, 2012 4:59 PM ARC
11 Feb 13, 2012 4:14 PM Georgia State University
12 Feb 13, 2012 3:02 PM School of City and Regional Planning, Georgia Tech
13 Feb 13, 2012 2:54 PM Keiser Consulting













Ronald Lall Feb 18, 2012 1:55 AM No, not if success depends on how closely to the desired outcome the result actually was.
Richelle (Shelly) PattonFeb 17, 2012 9:22 PM Yes.
Meaghan Vlkovic Feb 16, 2012 4:11 PM It was for HOPE VI and Single family loans.
4 Feb 15, 2012 6:36 PM
Jim Wehner Feb 14, 2012 8:38 PM
Christy (Norwood) TaylorFeb 14, 2012 5:14 PM
Graduate Student Research : Priorities for 




The downpayment assistance allocation was 
very successful.  It helped encourage and 
sustain home purchases during a period when 
the Atlanta housing market was very 
depressed.  The CHDO funding and other 
development funding was difficult to disburse, 
as it was set up to be gap funding at a time 
when developers could not get primary 
development funds from other sources.
We have a number of families in the 
neighborhood that we serve that have received 
DPA.  But I do not know if these monies came 
through the Housing Opportunity Fund or from 
other sources?  Besides that, it is difficult to 
comment on success because Charis and the 
neighborhood we serve were not recipients of 
these funds.
Mortgage Assistance for Homebuyers - When 
the funding pool dries up, the sale of our homes 
drops significantly.
Dawn J. Luke Feb 13, 2012 9:53 PM
John O'Callaghan Feb 13, 2012 9:02 PM
Ernestine Garey Feb 13, 2012 8:34 PM No.
Dan Reuter Feb 13, 2012 4:59 PM Dont have enough information.  Unfamiliar with use.
Deirdre Oakley Feb 13, 2012 4:15 PM That's hard to say because the figures provide not context.
Dan Immergluck Feb 13, 2012 3:02 PM
Andy SchneggenburgerF b 13, 2012 4:15 AM






















































































Ownership units for 
households below 30% 
AMI.





Ownership units for 
households between 30% 
and 50% AMI.
4 4 1 4 0 2.38 13
No.  As the administrator of the program, we 
have revised the allocation several times to 
address market conditions.  The program 
components should be established and be firm 
but dollars should be fluent.
Yes.  The capital was largely expended in ways 
that supported families and neighborhoods
Yes. The fact that it hif ed to mortgage 
assistance makes some sense given tight 
credit markets. However, there should probably Generally, although I think there was perhaps 
too much specialization in the lending 
categories, and some terms that clearly were 
Graduate Student Research : Priorities for Atlanta's Housing Opportunity Fund
Please rate, from 1 (no consideration/emphasis) to 5 (highest priority) the following 
Answer Options




Rental units for 
households between 80% 
and 120% AMI.






Relocation and other 
assistance for foreclosed 
homeowners.





Ownership units for 
households between 80% 
and 120% AMI.
0 5 1 4 2 3.25 12




Rental units for 
households between 50% 
and 80% AMI.
1 1 3 8 0 3.38 13
Foreclosure 
prevention. Foreclosure prevention.





Ownership units for 
households between 50% 
and 80% AMI.
1 0 4 8 0 3.46 13




Rental units for 
households below 30% 
AMI.
1 2 0 9 1 3.54 13




Rental units for 
households between 30% 
and 50% AMI.











Mitigation of negative 


















Meaghan Vlkovic Feb 16, 2012 4:16 PM
2 Feb 15, 2012 6:42 PM
Dawn J. Luke Feb 13, 2012 9:57 PM
Deirdre Oakley Feb 13, 2012 4:17 PM












There needs to be funding focused on the preservation 
of multi-family housing and single family 
acquisition/rehab rental - construction and permanent.  
The use of funds for single family rental will also allow 
opportunities for very low income and supportive 
housing units.
In the current environment, it seems that foreclosure 
prevention should be the highest priority.  However, 
there are sources of funds for foreclosure prevention 
that are not being effectively deployed - such as the 
Hardest Hit Funds.  And hopefully more sources will be 
coming from the federal government and the recent 
back settlement. Determining the gap would need to be 
closely looked at before determining a foreclosure 
prevention product for these funds.  There does not 
seem to be a clear source to replace NSP for 
acquisition and redevelopment of vacant properties - 
there is a definite and clear need.
Funds should be allocated to assist current owners with 
the rehabilation of existing homes.  In addition, there 
should be a pool for strategy acquisition, demolition 
and/or repositioning of properties (both multifamily & 
single family
Implementation of more services for homeless 
individuals and families
Clarification: Allocations for rental units in the below 30 
and 30-50 AMI ranges should be part of a 'Preservation' 
category. This would generally align with priorities from 
Enterprise Community Partners and another source 
that is escaping my memory at the moment.
Graduate Student Research : Priorities for Atlanta's Housing 





























Land Assemblage for 
future affordable housing 
sites (Financing for 
acquisition, demolition, 








Mitigation of negative 
impacts from vacant and 
foreclosed properties 12%
14.00 70 5








Loans – New 
Construction

















Relocation and other 










CHDO Loans (Financing 
part of the acquisition, 
construction, or 



























































































































































Ronald Lall Feb 18, 2012 1:59 AM 25 25 25 25
Richelle (Shelly) Patton Feb 17, 2012 9:28 PM 10 30 40 15 5
Meaghan Vlkovic Feb 16, 2012 4:33 PM 15 10 10 10 5 5 10 10 20 5
Christy (Norwood) Taylor Feb 14, 2012 5:20 PM 60 30 10
5 Feb 13, 2012 5:01 PM 20 20 20 20 20












Meaghan Vlkovic Feb 16, 2012 4:33 PM
Christy (Norwood) TaylorFeb 14, 2012 5:20 PM
Some of the above options could be wrapped into one program - 
single family acq/rehab which should be a revolving loan product, 
maybe keep some in the deal as subsidy to keep rents affordable 
and operational). Foreclosure response funds should be the top 
priority, wrapping affordable housing into the response measures. 
Regarding multi-family, a focus should be on rehab of distressed 
properties or expiring properties that are not obsolete in the Atlanta 
market. New construction should focus in areas of TOD and 
employemnt opportunities, or connected to a strategic plan with 
additional investment in a community.    We should understand why 
the CHDO funds were not used before realocating again.
Mitigation of negative impacts from vacant and foreclosed properties 
- this would decrease crime, increase a community's desirability and 
thus increase sales.
Graduate Student Research : Priorities for 
answered question
skipped question
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Richelle (Shelly) PattonFeb 17, 2012 9:28 PM
Meaghan Vlkovic Feb 16, 2012 4:33 PM
I do not think that the breakdown of uses needs to be so strictly 
confined to new construction vs. rehab, I think the funds should be 
more flexible to be used for projects that meet market demand and 
have the best ability to secure other funds to leverage the HOF 
funds.  I think general categories, like "rental" and "homeownership" 
support is sufficient.
I think new construction should be tied to transit and employment 
opportunities.  There is so much vacant foreclosed stock, that most 
of the funds for a future issuance should focus on RESTORING 
Atlanta as part of a foreclosure response.
Answer Options
answered question
skipped question
